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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research was to examine the factors 
which motivated managers' choices of transition method for 
the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
No. 106 (SFAS 106), Employers' Accounting for Post.retirement 
Benefits Other Than Pensions. This statement allowed 
employers the option of recognizing the entire transition 
amount in the year of adoption or amortizing it over a 
future period. Many opponents of this statement had 
expressed concern that the large financial impact brought 
about by recognizing this obligation would cause managers to 
seek ways to minimize the effect, possibly at the expense of 
plan participants. Since managers had the opportunity to 
make a choice of how to recognize this obligation, there 
existed a possibility that managers could use the adoption 
of SFAS 106 in attempt to justify plan changes. Thus, the 
primary question of interest in this research was: "Is there 
a significant relationship between plan amendments and 
transition method choice?"
In this research, severa1 variables wh ich were spec i f ic 
to the issue of postretirment benefits (a ratio measuring 
maturity of a firm's workforce, the size of the transition 
obligation, concurrent adoption of SFAS 109, and the 
announcement of plan amendments) were examined along with 
some of the more traditional firm specific variables which
have previously been shown to influence decisions made by 
managers. A sample of 196 firms collected from COMPUSTAT 
and NAARS data bases was used and eight hypotheses were 
tested using both univariate analysis and logistic 
regression models. Five variables were shown to be 
significant to the choice of transition method choices: 
bonus plan, early adoption, industry regulation, maturity 
a firm's workforce, and concurrent adoption of SFAS 109. 
There was no evidence that the announcement of plan 
amendments was significant to the transition method choice 
thus contradicting the theory that firms would use the 
adoption of SFAS 106 to justify plan amendments.
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The purpose of this research is to examine the factors 
which motivate managers' choices of transition method for 
the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
No. 106 (SFAS 106), Employers' Accounting for 
Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions. In December 
1990, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
issued SFAS 106, requiring all firms which offer 
postretirement benefits other than pensions (PRB) to accrue 
the cost of these benefits, instead of the more popularly 
used cash (or pay-as-you-go) method. While having no 
direct bearing on the cash flow for most firms, this 
requirement does significantly affect the financial 
statements of many American companies,1 To ease this
1Total liability for the 500 largest US firms was 
estimated at $2 trillion (Cross et al 1989). The liability 
was expected to reduce pre-tax profits by an average of 7.5% 
(Berton 1990). Preliminary studies projected that the annual 
expense of early adopters will be two to seven times higher 
than the previous pay-as-you-go method. (Ernst and Young 
1991, Coopers and Lybrand 1989). Leauby, Ugras and Welsh 
(1993) found that OPEB costs of early adopters averaged .66% 




offered a choice of two methods of recognizing the
transition {previously existing) obligation. Firms could
select between recognizing the entire obligation in the
year of adoption (immediate recognition method) or
amortizing the obligation over a future period, not to
exceed 20 years (delayed recognition method).
A unique concern relative to the adoption of SFAS 106
was the potential effect on retiree health benefits. As
this statement was developed, there was a widespread
assumption that the adoption of SFAS 106 would lead to
reduction or deletion of retiree health benefits
(Henriques, 1989; Cameron 1992; Hittelstaedt and Warshawsky
1993).2 The FASB addressed this issue as follows:
Some believe that employers will change the 
designs of postretirement benefits plans or the 
way those plans are financed as a result of the 
new information about the financial effects of 
postretirement benefits. . . . Those actions, if
taken, are not the direct result of a requirement 
to accrue postretirement benefits, but rather, 
may result from more relevant and useful 
information on which to base decisions (FASB
1990) .
2 A survey from KPMG Peat Marwick reports that the 
percentage of midsize companies offering retiree health 
benefits fell from 44% to 37% between 1991 and 1992. Among 
large employers (1,000 to 4,999 employees) the drop was from 
56% to 52%. The survey also reported that retirees are being 
asked to bear a substantially higher share of the cost of 
coverage. The increase was 16% for those with single 
coverage and 18% for those with family coverage for a four 
year period. (Williams 1993)
3
In March, 199 3, the Subcommittee on Labor of the U.S.
Senate Committee of Labor and Human Resources held hearings 
on the erosion of employer-sponsored retiree health 
benefits. Blame was placed on SFAS 106, the increasing 
costs of health care, and the lack of national health 
insurance (Rappaport and Malone 1993).
Many firms have reduced their coverage for current 
and/or future retirees while other benefits are targeted 
for future reductions (Goeppinger and Doebbelaere 1993 ; 
Warshawsky, Mittelstaedt and Cristea 1993). In a study 
examining the decision to reduce coverage in employer- 
sponsored retiree health care plans, Mittelstaedt, Nichols, 
and Regier (1994) found support for three explanations as 
to why firms reduce PRB coverage: increased contracting
cost caused by the adverse financial reporting consequences 
of SFAS 106, financial weakness in the absence of SFAS 106, 
and firm specific increases in retiree health costs. While 
the second and third explanations concern conditions which 
existed prior to the time of SFAS 106 adoption, the 
financial reporting consequences can be directly affected 
by the transition method choice. Managers desiring to 
justify plan amendments (in order to reduce costs and 
increase income) can show significantly differing PRB costs 
depending on the transition method they select. If a firm 
recognizes the transition obligation completely in the year
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of adoption, it will show a larger expense than will the 
firm which chooses to amortize over a future period.3 
This presents an opportunity to use financial reporting in 
a manner designed to accomplish a desired purpose. The 
extent to which this may or may not have occurred is of 
primary concern because it would violate the neutrality of 
the accounting information.
To explore these potential concerns, the following 
research question is examined:
Is there a significant relationship between plan
amendments and SFAS 106 transition method choice?
Examination of managers' use of accounting method choice in 
new adoptions has been part of many previous studies (Daley 
and Vigeland 1983; Ayres 1986; Imhoff and Thomas 1988; 
Langer and Lev 1993; and Ali and Kumar 1993, among others). 
Three primary areas of firm-specific characteristics have 
been found to influence managers' choices: debt covenants,
bonus plans and political costs. This study examines the 
relationship between plan amendments and choice of 
transition method in the adoption of SFAS 106, using a
3 Warshawsky, Mittelstaedt and Cristea (199 3) suggest 
that if delayed recognition of the transition obligation is 
used, the median firm will suffer an 8% decline in after-tax 
earnings, while the median firm using immediate recognition 
will suffer an immediate 73% decrease from the cumulative 
effect of the change in accounting principle and an 
additional 4.7% in earnings thereafter. A median firm using 
immediate recognition would also increase the debt/asset 
ratio by more than 5%.
model which includes previously established firm-specific 
characteristics such as debt covenants, bonus plans and 
political costs, as well as several variables specific to 
post-retirement issues.
To address these issues, a sample of publicly-traded 
firms was selected from the Compustat and National 
Automated Accounting Research System (NAARS) data systems 
based on adoption information reported in footnotes to 
financial statements for the years 1989 to 1993. The model 
was developed to judge the effect of firm-specific 
variables on the dependent variable, transition method 
choice. Univariate analysis was on the independent 
variables and logistic regression was used to test the 
model. Financial data was collected from the COMPUSTAT, 
DISCLOSURE and NEXIS data bases and from US. Department of 
Labor Forms 5500.
Examination of the research question provides 
information about the motivating factors behind managers' 
decisions in adopting a new standard. Conclusions can be 
drawn as to how managers use allowable accounting method 
alternatives to meet individual or firm objectives. The 
significance of this result to the adoption of new 
accounting standards could provide a valuable resource to 
standard setting bodies, investors, and stakeholders, as 
well as providing additional material for further research.
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Background of Retiree Health Banafit Accounting
The Social Security Act of 1935 was the first attempt 
by the federal government to provide retirement income 
security to American citizens. When wages were frozen 
during World War II, employers began to offer privately 
sponsored pension plans and health care benefits. Congress 
passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
in 1974, which mandated reporting and funding requirements 
for corporate pension and profit sharing plans, but in 
ensuring that commitments made to retirees regarding future 
income were secure, the government overlooked other post­
employment benefits (OPEB). Employers continued to view 
retiree health care as part of the active cost of having 
employees, by including the expense on a pay-as-you-go 
basis, instead of recognizing deferred compensation.
The differences between pension accounting and the 
treatment of OPEB became apparent in the 1980s and early 
1990s when employers were faced with increasing costs as a 
result of three trends: (l) rising health care costs, (2)
younger retirees and (3) longer life expectancy. Since 
1980, health care costs in the United States have risen at 
an average annual rate of 10.5%. (In 1987, General Motors' 
U.S. health care costs rose by 32% to nearly $3 billion 
(Loomis 1989).) In 1991, the cost of health care in the 
United States was $666.2 billion, or 12.2% of the Gross
7
National Product (GNP) (Koretz 1991). The Wyatt Company, 
an employee benefits consulting firm, predicts that the 
entire GNP will be spent on health care by about 2070 if 
nothing is done to break the "inflationary spiral" (Cooper
1991).
In the late 1970s, the FASB became concerned about the 
lack of information in financial statements regarding 
employer-sponsored OPEB. They felt that a liability to 
employees existed and failure to report this information 
could be a material misrepresentation of financial 
position.4 Hence, in 1979 the FASB added OPEB to the 
project on employers1 accounting for pensions. Several 
memoranda issued in the early 1980s presented the tentative 
conclusion that an employer has an obligation for promised 
postretirement benefits (PRB) and that the cost of 
postemployment health care and other benefits should be 
accrued during the service lives of the employees in order 
to properly match the expenses and revenue in the 
appropriate time period. In 1984, the FASB decided to 
separate employers' accounting for OPEB from the on-going
4 Martin Dubilier, of Clayton and Dubilier, the 
leveraged buy-out firm bought Uniroyal for around $1 billion 
in 1985. He later discovered that included in the purchase 
was an undisclosed liability estimated at $600 million for 
promised postretirement benefits. He is quoted as saying "If 
we had known what we were getting into, we would never have 
done the Uniroyal deal" (Jereski 1987).
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pension project since members believed that OPEB might be 
overshadowed by pension issues.
The Exposure Draft on OPEB was issued in February 
1989. Response was generally favorable, but several areas 
were challenged, including the transition method. While 
recognizing that immediate recognition would give the most 
conceptual improvement to financial statements (since it 
would bring all companies to a properly stated position and 
protect the comparability of statements), the FASB also 
realized that the magnitude of the obligation would 
possibly distort the adoption year's annual earnings 
figures. Thus the FASB required amortization of the 
transition obligation over a 15 year period. The rationale 
stated for this choice was that the understandability and 
comparability of financial reports would be improved by the 
uniform phasing in of the liability by all employers and 
that actuarial techniques are developing and should become 
more reliable over time, leading to more accurate 
information during the recognition period (FASB 1909,
1990).
Respondents were generally in favor of delayed 
recognition, but proposed a longer amortization period. 
Nonetheless, several respondents wanted an option allowing 
the use of the immediate recognition method, arguing that 
immediate recognition provided a simpler method and could
be justified since a significant portion of the obligation 
relates to costs incurred in a prior period (FASB 1990) .
The Statement, which was issued in December of 1990, 
included both of these suggestions. A choice of transition 
method was allowed and the amortization period was extended 
to 20 years. With few exceptions, SFAS 106 became 
effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 
1992, but earlier adoption was encouraged.
To adopt SFAS 106, employers had to calculate two 
amounts: (1) the accumulated postretirement benefit
obligation (APBO) and (2) the fair value of the plan assets 
plus any recognized accrued postretirement benefit costs. 
The difference between these two amounts is the transition 
obligation and can be recognized fully in the period of 
adoption as a cumulative effect of a change in accounting 
principle or amortized over the remaining service period of 
active plan participants, to a maximum of 20 years. Under 
either method, the total liability must be disclosed in the 
footnotes to the financial statements. The service and 
interest costs for the current year are shown as operating 
expenses for each year.
While SFAS 106 has been compared to SFAS 87,
Employer's Accounting for Pensions, in that employers are 
required to change to an accrual method of accounting for a 
liability, there is one major difference: most pension
10
plans were pre-funded upon adoption of SFAS 87. Due to the 
lack of tax and legal incentives most firms had not funded 
PRB when SFAS 106 was issued. The pre-funding feature of 
SFAS 87 caused many firms to show a positive effect on 
income in the year of adoption.5 In contrast, firms 
adopting SFAS 106 experience an income-decreasing effect.
summary
This research examines how the choice of transition 
method is affected by firm specific variables, those 
previously established in management choice literature and 
some specific to the issue of postretirement benefits.
Most previous research on firm characteristics in relation 
to SFAS 106 concentrates on early vs. late adopters (Amir 
and Livnat 1993; Amir and Ziv 1994; Leauby, Ugras and Welsh 
1993) and on the effect of related announcements on share 
prices (Espahbodi, Strock, and Tehranian 1991). Other 
related research attempts to show how the market can 
estimate OPEB costs from previous pay-as-you-go costs and 
examines the effects of early adoption (Amir 1993 and 
Mittelstaedt and Warshawsky 1993). Mittelstaedt, Nichols, 
and Regier (1994) attempt to explain why firms are changing
5In studies of early adopters of SFAS 87, Langer and Lev 
(1993), Norton (1989) and Stone and Ingram (1988) all 
indicated that the majority of plans were funded upon 
adoption and the effect on income was positive. Norton found 
that later adopters had similar, but not as large 
characteristics.
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retiree health plans. This current project differs from 
the others in that the choice of transition methods is 
examined to see if managers use their transition options to 
their own advantage or that of their firms.
SFAS 106 has been called "the most significant 
accounting change since the adoption of depreciation about 
80 years ago" by Eugene H. Flegm, assistant controller of 
General Motors Corporation (Berton 1990, p. A3). Gregg and 
Herring (1992, p. 18) call SFAS 106 "the most controversial 
statement ever released by the FASB". Extending the 
existing research on the adoption of this statement will 
give additional information to the FASB for use in future 
deliberations on other heated issues.
This chapter presented an introduction and overview of 
the study. Chapter 2 is a review of relevant literature. 
Chapter 3 contains the hypotheses and their development.
The results of the study are provided in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 contains a summary of the findings and related 
implications.
CHAPTER 2
Review of Positive Accountin? Literature
overview
The foundation for this research is the positive 
accounting theory which states that managers make 
accounting choices based on economic incentives. By making 
choices among alternative accounting practices which are 
allowed under generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP), managers exercise significant control over 
financial statements. These financial statements can, in 
turn, affect the wealth of the manager, as well as that of 
the stakeholders. As a result of pressures and controls 
exerted by stakeholders and other external parties upon 
management, costs arise which have been shown to play a 
significant role in a manager's selection of accounting 
methods. The costs found to be most significant in decision 
making have been categorized as agency and political costs.
Agency costs arise as a result of a relationship that 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) situationally define as whenever 
one or more principals engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on the principals’ behalf that
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involves delegating some decision-making authority to the 
agent. Examples of agency costs are bonding expenses, 
auditing fees, bonus plans, etc. Political costs are 
attributed to the potential use of power that exists to 
affect the distribution of wealth in society, primarily by 
regulatory agencies or political groups. Some examples of 
political costs are taxes placed on certain industries (the 
windfall profits tax on oil and gas enterprises), and 
environmental control activities.
Accounting numbers (e.g. net income, debt, equity, 
etc.) are often used as a measuring device by which parties 
assess the activities of the firm and management. As a 
result, managers have an incentive to carefully select 
accounting methods to achieve desired results. Accounting 
researchers have attempted to determine why managers choose 
certain accounting methods over others. By considering 
agency and political costs, researchers suggest three main 
hypotheses to explain the differences in choice of 
accounting methods by managers: the debt hypothesis, the 
bonus plan hypothesis and the political cost hypothesis.
Gordon (1964) and Gordon, Horowitz, and Meyers (1966) 
are credited (Zimmerman 1980, Zmijewski and Hagerman 1981) 
with the first serious attempts to construct a positive 
accounting theory by attempting to develop systematic 
explanations of managers' choices of accounting procedures.
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Their works were based on the income smoothing hypothesis 
and on the proposition that capital markets are 
inefficient. Gordon assumed that stock price is a function 
of growth and variance in reported earnings and that 
managers choose accounting methods in attempts to smooth 
net income. Two assumptions were made about managers' 
behavior: that managers maximize their utility and that
their utility depends on stock price. Therefore, managers 
choose accounting procedures that maximize growth but 
minimize variance in reported earnings, thus attempting to 
maximize share price. Ball (1972) and Sunder (1975) found 
that, at the aggregate market level, the market adjusts in 
accordance with the efficient market hypothesis and thus, 
managers are probably not motivated to choose methods to 
smooth income for this reason.
Further analysis of managers' accounting choices by 
Watts (1977), Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1979), Smith and 
Warner (1979), Leftwich (1980), and Holthausen (1980), 
among others, led Zimmerman (1980) to summarize the then 
current state of positive theory in three points.
1. The production process of the firm 
requires the combination of various 
factors of production which are usually 
owned by different parties. . . . The
self-interest of each of these parties 
gives rise to a set of agency problems 
and hence the view of the firm as "a 
nexus of contracts" which is the least 
cost solution to the agency problem
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(Jensen and Meckling 1976 and Fama
1980).
2. Accounting numbers are useful devices
in some of the contracts that are
written to reduce the agency costs of 
certain conflicts (Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Watts 1977; Watts and Zimmerman 
1978, 1979; and Smith and Warner 1979). 
In particular, accounting numbers are 
used in debt contracts (Leftwich 1980 
and Holthausen 1980) management 
compensation contracts (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1978) and corporate by-laws 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1979).
3. Accounting numbers are also used by
government to regulate and tax the firm 
(Watts 1977; and Watts and Zimmerman 
1978, 1979). Government regulation 
takes two forms. Direct regulation. . .
is the more commonly thought of form. .
. . Besides direct regulation, 
individuals using the powers of the 
state can transfer wealth from the firm 
via affirmative action, OSHA, SPA, 
antitrust, price controls etc. These 
latter activities impose what we call 
"political costs" on the firm which 
managers attempt to reduce via 
lobbying, public relations and lower 
reported earnings. Accounting numbers 
are often used in these struggles to 
transfer corporate wealth.
Studies supporting these early theories have led to 
the development of three main hypotheses to explain why 
managers make accounting choices: Watts and Zimmerman
(1986) hypothesized the following relationships between the 
accounting method choice theory and related variables:
Bonus plan hypothesis: Managers of firms with
bonus plans are more likely to choose accounting
16
procedures that shift reported earnings from 
future periods to the current period.
Debt/equity hypothesis: The larger a firm's 
debt/equity ratio, the more likely the firm's 
manager is to select accounting procedures that 
shift reported earnings from future periods to 
the current period.
Size hypothesis: The larger the firm, the more
likely the manager is to choose accounting 
procedures that defer reported earnings from 
current to future periods, to avoid political 
costs.
The bonus plan hypothesis, debt/equity hypothesis and 
size hypothesis are related to managers’ compensation, debt 
covenants and political processes respectively. Using the 
above theoretical support, studies have been designed 
either to explain and predict the choice of accounting 
methods in use (e.g. Hagerman and Zmijewski 1979) or to 
find the effect on accounting method choice of variations 
in the explanatory variables (e.g. Healy 1985).
Researchers have used managers' method choices in several 
situations to examine the hypotheses. Several studies 
focus on managers' discretionary accounting choices (e.g. 
Bartov 1993, Dhaliwal 1980) while others have examined the 
activities of managers and firms in relation to the 
issuance of new standards or guidelines (Gujarathi and 
Hoskin 1992, Watts and Zimmerman 1978). The following 
discussion of some of the most frequently cited research 
studies in positive accounting is divided between studies
17
of managers' activities involving discretionary accounting 
choices and studies of activities mandated by newly issued 
or proposed accounting standards.
Discretionary Accounting Choices 
Two frequently mentioned studies which attempted to 
explain accounting choice by examining existing accounting 
methods are Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) and Zmijewski and 
Hagerman (1981).’ Hagerman and Zmijewski, using Probit 
analysis, investigated the association between the choice 
of a single-accounting method (the dependent variable) and 
the concentration ratio, profit sharing, risk, capital 
intensity, net sales, and total assets (the explanatory 
variables). Four single-accounting methods (Depreciation, 
Inventory, Investment tax credit and Pension costs 
amortization) were used to build four different models all 
using the same explanatory variables (except the inventory
Both studies examined the same 300 companies (drawn 
from CRSP) using the same four accounting method choices.
In the first study examination of the choices individually 
led to the rejection of the null hypothesis (that the model 
cannot predict the choice of method better than random 
assignment of firms to each method) at the .01, .05 and .10
levels for size, depreciation, and investment tax and 
pension choices, respectively. The 1981 study attempted to 
diffuse some of the criticisms of the earlier one by 
examining portfolio effects and was able to reject the null 
hypothesis (that the model is no better than predicting 
equal probability of selecting each choice) at the .001 
level. However, a null hypothesis that the model is no 
better than predicting that firms will adopt the most 
common strategy, is rejected at the .25 level.
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model, which added effective tax rate). The dependent 
variable was assigned based on whether the accounting 
method was income-decreasing or income-increasing (0,1 
respectively).
Hagerman and Zmijewski found that the theory was able 
to explain some of the managers' choices of methods. All 
models predicted the choice of method better than a model 
of randomly assigned firms. The best result was for the 
depreciation method, with an R of .43 They also found 
that larger firms tend to use accounting procedures that 
reduce reported earnings, indicating that the size of a 
company has some explanatory power in accounting method 
choice.
The study was criticized because it did not include 
any variables related to debt covenants and because the 
results did not seem to predict any better than the naive 
strategy of following the most common method. (The 
depreciation method chosen by 8 5 percent of the firms was 
straight-line, Hagerman and Zmijewski's model was correct 
85.33 percent of the time [Watts and Zimmerman 1986].) The 
study also failed to take into account that managers' 
decisions are rarely based on a single-method, but are 
usually part of a portfolio of accounting methods.
Zmijewski and Hagerman expanded on the previous 
research by examining a firms’ portfolio of four accounting
19
procedures. The same method of assigning the dependent
variable was used, resulting in 16 possible portfolios.
Three assumptions were made about the magnitude of the 
effect of the methods on the firm's income:
1. All four procedures have the same 
impact on reported earnings.
2. The pension cost and investment tax 
credit alternatives have one-half the 
effect of the inventory and 
depreciation alternatives.
3. The effects of pension costs and tax 
credits are equal but less than one-
half of the effect of inventory and
depreciation alternatives on reported 
income.
Zmijewski and Hagerman added two new variables, risk and 
debt/total assets to Hagerman and Zmijewski's set of 
explanatory variables. Results of the Probit analysis 
indicated that all estimated coefficients had their 
predicted signs and that size, management compensation, 
concentration ratio, and total debt to total assets had a 
significant association with the dependent variable. The 
model was most applicable to large firms and those in 
highly concentrated industries. This study provided strong 
support for positive accounting theory, indicating that 
firms use an overall income strategy rather than making 
choices based on isolated accounting methods.
Press and Weintrop (1990) used a five-strategy 
methodology similar to Zmijewski and Hagerman's to assign
20
values to the dependent variable. They made a few changes 
in explanatory variables, incorporating a leverage 
constraint from SEC filings, annual reports, and Moody's 
Industrial Manuals. They also replaced the debt/total 
assets variable with four different measures. Their 
results show an improvement over Zmijewski and Hagerman (an 
R of .23 compared to .090) especially when the constraints 
defined in the debt covenants were included.
Kelly (1983) reviewed 14 studies that focused on 
manager's discretionary accounting choices and their 
reaction to standards. She categorized the studies into 
those that concerned management's voluntary choices to 
establish an optimal mix of accounting policies and studies 
that concerned corporate reaction to mandated accounting 
changes. In examining studies of discretionary accounting 
choices, Kelly used positive accounting theory to define 
the central question as: whether the voluntary selection
of accounting procedures was used to influence the level of 
executive incentive compensation or to reduce the 
restrictiveness of debt covenants or exposure to political 
costs, thereby enhancing the firm's stock prices.
The five studies which Kelly examined concerning 
discretionary accounting choice (Bowen, Lacey, and Noreen 
1981; Dhaliwal 1980; Dhaliwal, Salamon, and Smith 1982; 
Hagerman and Zmijewski 1979; and Zmijewski and Hagerman
21
1981) supported the positive accounting theories. As 
previously discussed, Kelly included results of Hagerman 
and Zmijewski (1979), which found that the explanatory 
variables depended upon accounting method choice. Results 
were strengthened when tests were performed using a 
portfolio of accounting choices in Zmijewski and Hagerman 
(1981) .
Dhaliwal (1980) examined the influence of a firm's 
leverage on decisions concerning oil and gas exploration 
costs prior to SFAS 19. He used 33 pairs of firms matched 
by sales revenue to test the hypothesis that the average 
debt/equity ratio of firms using full-cost accounting was 
larger than that of firms using the successful efforts 
method. A statistically significant difference was found, 
lending support to the theoretical debt hypothesis.
Dhaliwal examined the size effect by adjusting assets of 19 
of the full-cost firms to a successful-efforts basis and 
found a significant difference in firm size between the two 
methods. He interpreted this result to mean that larger 
firms might have been attempting to avoid earnings 
variability by using full cost accounting.
Bowen, Lacey, and Noreen (1981) tested a sample of 91 
pairs of firms matched by industry, to see if bonus plans, 
bond covenants, or political costs would affect the choice 
of capitalization of interest costs on assets under
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construction. They expected that firms with bonus plans 
and debt covenant restrictions would capitalize interest 
while firms facing political costs would not. Results 
confirmed that bond covenant variables and size for all 
industries other than oil and gas yielded the predicted 
results.
Dhaliwal, Salamon, and Smith (1982) hypothesized that 
percentage of management ownership of a firm would 
influence accounting method. Ownership control was used as 
a surrogate for incentive compensation schemes. They used 
the choice of depreciation method as their test variable 
for 83 firms. Results confirmed that the higher the 
percentage of ownership, the more likely managers were to 
choose an income-increasing accounting method.
Daley and Vigeland (1983) investigated managers' 
choices to capitalize or expense research and development 
(R&D) costs prior to 1974. Their research showed an 
association between choice of method and size (a proxy for 
political cost), leverage, and dividend restrictions. The 
political cost hypothesis was confirmed by results that 
indicated that smaller firms capitalized the R&D costs more 
often than larger firms, resulting in higher income during 
periods of capitalization. They also confirmed that firms 
choosing to capitalize were more highly leveraged, had more
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public debt, and were closer to dividend restrictions than 
those firms choosing to expense R&D costs.
The relationship between debt covenants and accounting 
methods was also examined by Healy and Palepu (1990). They 
compared the firms' accounting and dividend responses to an 
increase in the restrictions of the dividend constraints. 
The hypothesis was that firms subject to dividend 
restrictions would, to circumvent the covenants, choose 
accounting methods that resulted in higher net income. To 
test this hypothesis, they used changes in single­
accounting method choices to find an association between 
changes in policies and dividend restrictions. Their 
results indicated that firms cut dividends, but did not 
appear to change accounting methods to bypass the 
restrictions.
In an attempt to justify the popular use of debt- 
equity ratios as a proxy for closeness to default on debt 
covenants, Duke and Hunt (1990) sampled 187 companies to 
test two hypotheses: first, that the debt-equity ratio is
positively linked to the existence of restrictive debt 
covenants and secondly, that there is a positive 
correlation between the debt-equity ratio and the 
restrictiveness of several common accounting-based debt 
covenant provisions. They examined previous research
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studies which used variations of leverage ratios. They 
calculated seven ratios for each sample firm.
Results indicated a positive relation between the 
seven ratio proxies and the existence of several common 
accounting-based debt covenants. They also found 
significant correlations between the debt proxies and the 
restrictiveness of the most "prevalent type" (p. 59) of 
covenant restriction, related to retained earnings. Duke 
and Hunt concluded that, for the extent to which most 
researchers wish to capture debt covenant restrictiveness, 
a debt to equity ratio is an acceptable proxy.
A recent study by Bartov (1993) examined the effect of 
the discretionary choice of timing the disposal of long- 
lived assets. He examined the debt hypothesis with regard 
to income recognition of the disposal. By taking 653 firm- 
year observations from 56 different industrial 
classifications, Bartov confirmed that managers took 
advantage of asset sales by timing the sale to mitigate 
accounting based restrictions in the firm's debt covenants.
Another type of research is the examination of how 
material changes in variables cause a change in accounting 
policies. If the positive accounting theory holds, then 
changes in management incentive variables, in debt 
contracting variables or in variables representing changes 
in the political environment, will cause firms to seek
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income-adjusting methods. Healy's (1985) study supported 
this theory. Healy partitioned the data according to 
details of management compensation plans and found that 
choices of accounting procedures corresponded to the 
maximization of management compensation. His study 
revealed that when the upper and lower limits in the
manager's income-based bonus plans changed, managers chose
a set of accounting methods that would increase their 
compensation.
Healy used proxy statements to identify the boundaries 
of bonus plans. He divided each company-year into three 
portfolios, UPP, LOW, and MID, based on whether the cash 
flow from operations exceeded the upper bound or fell below 
the lower bound of the bonus plan, or where neither was
binding. The mean value of accruals was calculated and
tested for statistically significant differences among the 
portfolios. There was a strong association between the 
amount of accruals and the upper and lower limits of bonus 
plans. His results confirmed the bonus plan hypothesis.
DeAngelo (1988) used proxy contests to see if a change 
in a firm's board of directors (political environment)
The value of accrual was calculated by totaling 
depreciation expense, extraordinary items, deferred income 
tax expense and changes in accounts receivable, inventory, 
accounts payable, and taxes payable. The amount was 
further adjusted for bonus-plan earnings definitions.
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caused a change in accounting numbers. She used a random 
walk model to find the unexpected amount of accruals for 
the period" to test if incumbent managers exercised their 
opportunity to present a favorable picture of their own 
performance to voters. Results confirmed this hypothesis 
and also showed that new managers took a "bath" to 




Research on the effects of a mandatory accounting 
change have yielded similar results, confirming the 
positive accounting theory hypotheses. These studies often 
examine a firm's activities prior to the issuance of or the 
required adoption date of new accounting standards, by 
studying the firm's lobbying efforts and early adoptions. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) examined whether the effect of a 
proposed standard on a firm's income would influence the 
firm's lobbying effort. Using the FASB's discussion 
memorandum on general price level adjustments (GPLA), they
’The expected amount of accruals was calculated by 
subtracting operating cash flow from the amount of net 
income in the period prior to the proxy contests. The 
unexpected amount was estimated by taking the difference 
between the expected and actual amounts. She did not 
separate the discretionary and non-discretionary parts of 
the accruals.
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examined comment letters and found 3 3 opposing and 18 
supporting a change. Firm size was confirmed as the only 
significant factor influencing lobbying position, with 
large firms opposing GPLA when the effect was to increase 
income.
Dhaliwal (1982) studied 44 firms that lobbied on the 
FASB's discussion memorandum on accounting for interest 
costs. He wanted to determine the role of agency theory 
variables and political costs in lobbying positions. The 
existence of management compensation plans and high 
leverage was expected to cause a firm to support interest 
capitalization. Large firms (a proxy for political costs) 
were expected to lobby against the standard. Only the 
leverage factor was found to be significant, supporting the 
debt hypothesis.
Kelly (1983) examined both the lobbying activities and 
changes in financing or operating activities in relation to 
the proposed standard on foreign currency translation. 
Results of a questionnaire revealed that 26 firms made 
financing or operating changes while 14 out of the 52 
respondents lobbied against the standard. Firms with 
greater incentive compensation and leverage, larger asset 
size, and lower management ownership exhibited more 
lobbying activities. Large size was related to financing 
and operating charges. Firms that were involved in both
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lobbying and changes were characterized by greater 
leverage, larger asset size, and smaller percentage of 
management ownership.
Earlv adoption
Many researchers have studied positive accounting 
hypotheses by examining a firm's choice to adopt a new 
standard prior to the required effective date. They 
hypothesized that a firm will adopt early if there is an 
appropriate income-decreasing or increasing effect.
Several recent studies have found results consistent with 
the bonus, debt and political costs hypotheses.
Stone and Ingram (1988) obtained survey results from 
227 companies that applied SFAS 87, Employer's Accounting 
for Pensions, in 1986. This standard, which required the 
recognition of pension expense and liability was, in 
general, income increasing, due to the funding requirements 
of previously existing pension regulations. They found 
that early adoption had a favorable income statement effect 
for most firms (101), with only five firms reporting 
increased pension expense.
Scott (1991) examined 279 firms with defined benefit 
plans to determine if agency and political cost variables, 
among others, were significant in the decision to adopt 
SFAS 87 prior to the effective date. Multivariate logistic 
analysis indicated that leverage was not significant to
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early adoption, while univariate tests of leverage yielded 
significant results, but an unexpected sign. He attributed 
the absence of the predicted result to the standard's 
minimal balance sheet effects. He tested four combinations 
of bonus calculations and boundary limits from firms with 
income-based bonus plans. Results indicated that a bonus 
plan is significant to the adoption decision, with the most 
significant results being attained where boundaries were in 
effect.
Scott hypothesized that the motivation to take a 
"bath" is also related to the existence of an income-based 
bonus plan. By including a BATH variable in his model, he 
showed the validity of his hypothesis for the early 
adoption firms. He also reported that regulated industries 
did not adopt SFAS 87 early and that late adopters were 
significantly larger firms than were early adopters. This 
finding was in line with accepted theory that the adoption 
was income-increasing and that politically sensitive 
industries desired the opposite reaction.
Sami and Welsh (1992) also achieved results that were 
consistent with evidence of systematic differences between 
firms choosing differing adoption dates. They posited 
that the FASB's policy of flexible transition periods 
allows firms to choose "a method of pension accounting that 
enhances their financial reports" (p. 234). They analyzed
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134 sample firms, 67 early adopters of SFAS 87 and a 
control group of equal number of non-early adopters matched 
by industry.
Their study differed from previous research in that 
they tested the debt hypothesis using dummy variables for 
the existence of debt constraints (on leverage, working 
capital, dividend payment and other accounting numbers 
frequently used in covenants) along with ratios for 
leverage, interest expense and dividends. Management- 
related variables, size, and pension-related variables were 
also included in the model. Early adopters were found to 
be subject to more accounting-based debt constraints and 
univariate tests showed significant differences between 
groups for dividend pay-out and interest coverage ratios. 
These results, which indicated that large firms or those 
with large pension plans were more likely to choose income- 
increasing changes, were not consistent with the political 
cost hypothesis. However, Sami and Welsh explained that 
results may partly reflect the inadequacy of size as a 
surrogate for political cost and that the amount of funding 
of the pension plan affected the timing decision.
Langer and Lev (1993) also examined managerial motives 
for selecting early adoption of SFAS 87, attempting to 
determine the effect of the FASB's multi year adoption 
period. They classified the motives into two groups:
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compliance costs or investor perceptions. They selected 
225 firms which adopted the standard in 1986 and 1987.
Two characteristics were significant in univariate tests: 
leverage and number of loans. In multivariate Logit tests, 
the only variable shown to be statistically significant in 
four models was the effect of adoption on earnings per 
share. The results failed to provide strong support for 
the FASB's contention that extended adoption periods led to 
reduced costs, but appeared to support earnings management 
as motivation for timing of the adoption.
Gujarathi and Hoskins (1992) examined the timing of 
adoption and the choice of transition method in managing 
earnings in the adoption of SFAS 96, Accounting for Income 
Taxes. A sample of 292 firms which adopted the standard 
prior to the effective date was selected. The cumulative 
effect method, which altered income in the adoption year 
was used by 232 firms, while the retroactive method, which 
altered retained earnings in the adoption year was selected 
by 60 firms. Analysis of the effect of the adoption on 
income revealed that 158 firms reported a significant 
increase in income, while only 22 reported a decrease. (The 
other firms were either deleted from the sample or showed 
an immaterial effect.) Many of those with earnings 
decreases were shown to be taking a "big bath", as their 
reported earnings would have been negative before the
32
effects of the adoption. These results confirmed that many 
firms were choosing to adopt SFAS 96 early to influence 
income.
Research on poatretirenent Benefits
SFAS 106 has been compared to SFAS 87 in that 
employers are required to account for both postretirement 
and pension benefits using the accrual method of 
accounting. There is one major difference, however.
Pension plans have been government regulated for several 
years and most were securely funded when SFAS 87 took 
effect. This allowed many firms to show an income- 
increasing effect upon the adoption of SFAS 87 (Langer and 
Lev 1993; Leauby, Ugras, and Welsh 1993a; Stone and Ingram 
1988). Postretirement benefits have not had the benefit of 
tax protection and thus, firms have had no incentive to 
advance-fund them. This situation will cause an income- 
decreasing effect for the majority of firms upon adoption 
of SFAS 106 (Leauby, Ugras, and Welsh 1993a) . Many 
researchers have replicated the pension studies done after 
issuance of SFAS 87, to determine if results are comparable 
in the area of postretirement benefits.
Two studies by Leauby, Ugras, and Welsh (1993a and 
1993b) examine the activities of early adopters of SFAS 
106. They proposed that firms adopting early did so in an
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effort to manage earnings. Three hypotheses were examined 
(Leauby, Ugras, and Welsh 1993b, p. 54).
1. Firms on the lower end of the projected two- 
to-seven-times increase from prior year cash cost 
will be more likely to be early adopters of SFAS 
106.
2. Firms adopting early will have earnings in 
the year of adoption below the level of the prior 
year.
3. Firms with a lower long-term debt-to-total 
assets ratio relative to the industry average 
will be more likely to adopt SFAS 106 early.
Sixty-four firms adopting the standard in 1990 and
1991 were selected from footnote disclosures on Disclosure
Inc. Firms were then divided into three groups based on
revenue size. Over 60 percent of the early adopters were
manufacturing companies. The first hypothesis was
confirmed by results indicating that sample firms averaged
1.64 times higher OPEB costs than under the previous, cash,
method. This indicated an increase in costs less than that
of the predicted two to seven times increase (Coopers and
Lybrand 1989; Ernst and Young 1991). The authors concluded
that this result reflected that early adopting firms were
those with a smaller increase in costs. The result may
also reflect actions taken to reduce plan costs by altering
the structure of the plan and its benefits.
Hypothesis two was also supported since results
indicated that sample firms averaged a 93.35 percent
34
decrease in operating income after controlling for the OPEB 
cost. Large firms had the largest percentage decrease in 
earnings (123%). The authors proposed that these results 
support the "big bath" hypothesis, that firms adopted 
early in years in which earnings were decreasing prior to 
the addition of OPEB costs.
The third hypothesis was supported for small and 
medium firms which showed significantly increased debt 
ratios. However, larger firms actually exhibited a decrease 
in the average debt/asset ratio in the year of adoption.
The authors attributed this to the flexibility of a larger 
company to adjust its capital structure prior to adoption.
One way of managing the impact of adopting SFAS 106 
was in the selection of transition method. Leauby, Ugras, 
and Welsh (1993b) found that only five of the 64 early 
adopters chose to defer the costs, with the remainder 
choosing to immediately recognize the entire balance.
The cumulative effect of immediate adoption for all firms 
was 28.58 percent of pretax income. The average decreases 
in income from the change were: $13,989 million for small 
firms, $44,526 million and $321,224 million for medium and 
large firms respectively. They found that assumptions 
about the discount rate and rate of return used to 
calculate the OPEB did not vary significantly across firms,
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with assumptions about health-care cost trends covering a 
wide range among the sample.
Amir and Livnat (1992) examined the choice: to adopt
SFAS 106 or to simply disclose the obligation prior to the 
date the standard became effective. The authors also 
examined the market reaction to receipt of information 
under each method. They found that the self-classification 
of a firm into one of the two groups was consistent with 
management attempts to influence investor perceptions.
They also found the average market reaction was more 
favorable for adopters than for disclosers.
Nine hypotheses were examined.
1. Firms with lower debt/asset ratios are more 
likely to adopt SFAS 106 earlier than other 
firms (p. 7).
2. Larger firms are likely to adopt the standard 
earlier than other firms (p. 8).
3. Firms with pension plans that have larger net 
plan assets are more likely to adopt SFAS 106 
earlier (p. 8).
4. Firms with a smaller impact of the standard on 
earnings, equity and total liabilities are likely 
to adopt the standard earlier (p. 9).
5. Firms with more extreme earnings changes 
(positive or negative) are more likely to adopt 
SFAS 106 earlier than other firms (p. 10).
6. Firms with greater earnings variability are 
more likely to adopt SFAS 106 earlier than other 
firms (p. 10).
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7. Financial institutions and public utilities 
(regulated industries) are likely to adopt the 
standard early (p. 11).
8. Firms with higher effective tax rates are more 
likely to adopt SFAS 106 earlier than other firms 
(p. 11).
9. a. The stock market reaction to the announcement of 
the OPEB liability is more favorable for the group of 
firms that adopted the standard than to those that 
merely disclosed the liability (p. 20-21) .
b. The market reaction is negatively correlated with 
the relative size of the liability (p. 21).
A sample of 133 early adopters and 105 disclosers was
obtained from the National Automated Accounting Research
System (NAARS)and COMPUSTAT data banks. Three multivariate
LOGIT analyses indicated that the significant explanatory
variables were the impact of the standard on earnings,
extreme earnings changes, regulation of the industry, and
to a lesser extent, variability of earnings and effective
tax rate. The authors concluded that the decision to
recognize or disclose was not based on compliance costs,
but on management's desire to change investor's
perceptions.
Tests indicated a significant difference in market 
reaction to the announcement of the decision to either 
adopt or disclose. There was a positive reaction to firms 
announcing early adoption, indicating that investors did 
change their perceptions in line with management 
intentions. This study confirmed a difference in
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characteristics between groups adopting or disclosing OPEB 
liabilities and revealed that the market does react 
differently to differing choice of accounting methods.
Amir and Livnat (1994) examined the motives of firms 
that adopted SFAS 106 or disclosed the OPEB liability prior 
to 1993. Their study also confirmed that early adopters 
attempted to manage earnings. A sample of 88 adopters in 
1991, 239 adopters 1992 and 75 disclosers in 1991 was 
selected using COMPUSTAT and CRSP data. Six hypotheses 
were developed.
1. Firms that adopted/disclosed their PRB 
liability in 1991 have a more negative unexpected 
liability than firms that adopted the standard in 
1992 (p. 10).
2. In 1991, extreme earnings of 1991 adopters are 
greater than extreme earnings of 1992 initial 
adopters or 1991 disclosers. In 1992, extreme 
earnings of 1992 adopters are greater than those 
of 1991 adopters or 1991 disclosers (p. 13).
3. 1991 adopters and disclosers are more likely 
to be early adopters of SFAS 87 than 1992 initial 
adopters (p. 14).
4. 1991 adopters have lower financial leverage
and lower ratio of PRB liability to total book 
value of equity than 1992 adopters (p. 16).
5. 1992 adopters are more likely to renegotiate
their PRB liability and incur greater 
renegotiation costs than 1991 adopters (p. 19).
6. 1991 adopters have lower 1992 financial 
leverage than 1992 adopters. The latter have 
lower 1993 financing than 1991 adopters (p. 20).
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Tests of hypothesis one did not yield the expected 
results. Adopters and disclosers in 1991 were shown to 
have a larger, but not statistically significant, 
unexpected liability than the adopters in 1992. Amir and 
Livnat attributed this result to the possibility of 
measurement errors in their methodology and to the fact 
that their sample included only early adopters and 
disclosers and not those waiting until the mandatory 
adoption date. Hypothesis two was partially supported in 
that the 1991 earnings of adopters were significantly 
different from 1991 disclosers and 1992 adopters, but 1992 
earnings were not significantly different between groups. 
Results of tests were inconsistent with hypothesis three, 
revealing that early adoption of SFAS 87 did not lead to 
early adoption of SFAS 106, possibly because of the 
opposing effects on finaneial statements.
The possibility of encountering recontracting costs 
was analyzed in hypothesis four by measuring leverage and 
postretirement benefit (PRB) liability ratios. This 
hypothesis was confirmed and the authors concluded that 
disclosers and later adopters may have delayed adoption due 
to recontracting costs. Hypothesis five was analyzed to 
determine if a firm renegotiated its pension benefits. 
Results confirmed that 1992 adopters had larger and 
statistically significant renegotiation costs than 1991
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adopters. They concluded that 1992 adopters had been 
substantially more active in renegotiating PRB with 
employees. Hypothesis six was not supported: results did
not indicate a significant difference in financing between 
the two groups.
Multivariate analysis was conducted to consider the 
various characteristics simultaneously. The results were 
similar to those of the previously discussed univariate 
tests. Extreme earnings of 1991 adopters, PRB ratio, and 
renegotiation costs were found to be significant. The 
authors indicated that 1991 adopters were motivated to 
adopt early for earnings management and lower recontracting 
costs, and because adoption had a smaller impact on them 
than on 1992 adopters. The later adopters attempted to 
offset negative effects by renegotiating the benefits with 
employees. Market tests indicated that the market 
was able to "see through" the attempts at earnings 
management and reduction of liability by renegotiations.
Amir and Ziv (1994) examined the motivation to adopt 
SFAS 106 early based on a manager's private information. 
They predicted that firms whose managers possessed 
favorable information would adopt early, firms with neutral 
information would disclose and firms with unfavorable 
information would wait until the mandatory adoption date 
and renegotiate the liability. A sample consisting of 103
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1991 adopters, 264 1992 adopters, 76 1991 disclosers, and 
75 "late" adopters was selected. Four predictions were 
speci fied.
1. (Liability order) The PRB liability for firms 
adopting the standard early is relatively lower 
than that for firms disclosing the liability 
without formally adopting the standard. In 
addition, the liability of the latter is lower 
than the expected liability of firms that wait 
until the mandatory date.
2. (Market reaction) On average, the market 
reaction to a firm's early adoption of the 
standard is positive, and greater than the market 
reaction to disclosure of the expected liability 
without adoption.
3. (Renegotiations--consistency of assumptions)
Firms waiting until the mandatory date are more 
likely to renegotiate the PRB liability with 
other stakeholders than those adopting early.
In addition, the PRB of firms involved in 
renegotiations is relatively higher than that of 
those not involved in renegotiations.
4. At the mandatory adoption date, the average 
liability of disclosing firms is higher than that 
of firms that adopted earlier. Furthermore, firms 
that disclosed information in footnotes are 
expected to experience more variation in 
liabilities than early adopters. (This prediction 
was not analyzed at this point, since data would 
be available only after the adoption date.)
Amir and Ziv contended that other factors may enter into
the decision to adopt early. They included variables to
test the debt, compensation, and size hypotheses in their
model.
Wilcoxon non-parametric and T-tests yielded univariate 
test results consistent with predict ions one and three and
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consistent with the debt and compensation hypotheses. 
Multivariate tests indicated that size of PRB liability and 
the renegotiation variable were significant in the decision 
to adopt or disclose. Results indicated that renegotiation 
of plan benefits in order to reduce the size of the PRB 
liability occurred more frequently among firms that delayed 
adoption.
Tests of prediction two showed that the cumulative 
market adjusted returns (CMAR) for 1991 adopters was 
positive and significantly different from zero. There was 
no significant reaction for disclosing firms or 1992 
adopters when related information was announced, indicating 
that the market looked more favorably on early adoption.
The authors concluded that the evidence supported their 
three predictions and also provided weaker support for the 
bond covenant and compensation theories.
Several studies have attempted to predict or measure 
the effects of SFAS 106 on financial statements, plan 
benefits and market prices. Warshawsky, Mittelstaedt, and 
Cristea (1993) examined financial statement effects by 
using the pay-as-you-go costs to estimate the PRB 
liability. Their sample consisted of 476 firms that 
sponsored retiree health plans and reported pay-as-you-go 
costs and 1383 firms not sponsoring plans.
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Wilcoxon rank-sum tests indicated significant 
differences between the two groups in four variables 
relative to size: market value of common stock, total
assets, sales and employees. Also, results indicated that 
firms sponsoring plans had larger leverage ratios and 
after-tax earnings than firms with no plans. The sample was 
divided into five demographic groups as defined by the 
American Academy of Actuaries Committee on Pension 
Actuarial Principles and Practices, based on the change in 
the number of employees in the period 1986 to 1989 as 
reported on COMPUSTAT. Ratios of accrued expenses and 
liabilities to pay-as-you-go costs were calculated for each 
group using current expenses and assumptions about future 
costs and life expectancies. Sample firms were then 
assigned to a group and the ratios were applied to each 
firm's reported pay-as-you-go costs to obtain an estimate 
of the effects of SFAS 106
For firms using the deferred transition method, the 
mean accrued after-tax expense was estimated to be $45.0 
million, a decrease in earnings of 35.1 percent. Firms 
using the immediate recognition method had an estimated 
mean expense of $31.3, causing a 314 percent drop in the 
year of adoption and a 20 percent on-going decrease. The 
mean estimated after-tax accrued liability for both groups 
was $274 million, almost 6 percent of total assets and 17
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percent of the market value of common stock. The mean
effect of immediate recognition on a leverage ratio was a
9.6 percent increase. Examination by industry revealed
that some industries experience a greater effect than
others, with the steel industry showing a 27 percent
increase in leverage and a 15 percent decline in earnings.
The authors pointed out that although it is expected
that a change in accounting standards should have no
implications, and that an efficient market would absorb all
the necessary information, several findings indicated
otherwise. They reported that many companies are changing
retiree health plans, bond rating agencies have backed away
from earlier promises not to revise corporate ratings, and
the evidence of financial statement effects has caused some
market reaction. Their results showed that managers can
influence the income effect of the standard by the
transition method they choose.
The market effects of pronouncements concerning
postretirement benefits were tested by Esphabodi, Strock,
and Tehranian (1991). They examined the dates of nine
pronouncement related to, but prior to the issuance of,
SFAS 106, to determine the effect of each pronouncement on
equity prices. Five hypotheses were examined.
1. The stock prices of firms providing 
nonpension postretirement benefits are reduced 
following announcements that increase the
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probability that the cash basis of accounting for 
these benefits will be eliminated.
2. The stock price reaction to announcements 
related to the proposed standard for nonpension 
postretirement benefits is positively related to 
the number of current retirees relative to 
current employees.
3. The stock price reaction to announcements 
related to the proposed standard for nonpension 
postretirement benefits is negatively related to 
the firm’s debt ratio.
4. The stock price reaction to announcements 
related to the proposed standard for nonpension 
postretirement benefits is positively related to 
the market value of the firm.
5. The stock price reaction to announcements 
related to the proposed standard is more 
pronounced for firms currently using the pay-as- 
you-go method for reporting nonpension 
postretirement benefits than for the firms using 
an accrual method.
An experimental group composed of 14 3 firms was 
selected based on the criteria that they offered 
postretirement benefits to employees and had disclosed 
information in footnotes on the Disclosure data tapes and 
that daily stock returns were available on CRSP tapes. 
Hypothesis one was tested using the daily stock returns. 
Hypotheses two through five were tested using the following 
variables: a ratio of current retirees to active employees; 
the debt ratio; the market value of the firm; and a dummy 
variable designating the use of an accrual method of 
accounting for PRB.
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Results testing the market reaction indicated that the 
only significant event was the issuance of the Exposure 
Draft. The average three-day abnormal return for the 
experimental firms was 3.02 percent. The tests also 
confirmed that the issuance of the Exposure Draft was the 
only significant event. Thus, all hypotheses were 
supported only for the issuance of the Exposure Draft.
Another study of the impact of PRB information upon 
the market was performed by Amir (1993). This study was 
designed to evaluate accounting methods ex ante using a 
ratio of PRB cash payments to retirees as disclosed by 
firms in footnotes prior to adoption of SFAS 106. The 
question was to determine if investors underestimated the 
full effect of the PRB liability on a firm's value. Amir 
wanted to see if an estimate of the present value of the 
PRB liability was "value-relevant" to investors.
A valuation model was derived by using the market 
value of the firm along with the earnings per share 
(including tax-adjusted PRB cash payments and pension 
expense), book value per share, tax-adjusted per share 
amount of cash paid by firms to retirees during the year, 
tax-adjusted pension expense per share, per share unfunded 
pension liability, and estimated PRB liability all deflated 
by the book value of equity at time t-l. The second stage 
of analysis included an adjustment to include the PRB
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liability in earnings and book value variables. The sample 
was selected by review of COMPUSTAT data. The number of 
firms used ranged from 243 in 1984 to 313 in 1990.
Analysis of the variables for two periods (1984-1986 
and 1987-1990) indicated that all of the coefficients in 
the second period were significantly smaller than those in 
the earlier period. This result supported the indication 
that there was a change in investors' perceptions over 
time. In the 1984-1986 period,investors were shown to 
underestimate the present value of current and future 
health care relative to the later period, when they 
translated $1 of cash payments to an average of $13.75 of 
obligation. The author suggested the following as possible 
explanations:
1. Investors changed their assessment of the 
future increase in health care costs.
2. The discount rate changed.
3. Investors updated their assessment of future 
PRB payments.
4. Court cases led investors to change their 
beliefs about the legal status of the PRB 
obligation.
5. Public debate about this issue drew more 
attention to it.
When the value of the PRB obligation was estimated and 
the relationship between market value and the estimated 
obligation was analyzed, results indicated that the PRB
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obligation was value-relevant to the investor in addition 
to the cash payment, and that cash payment was not value­
relevant when the numbers were adjusted to reflect the PRB 
obligation. This result indicated that investors preferred 
an estimate of the obligation that was calculated based on 
accounting information to cash information alone.
Mittelstaedt and Warshawsky (1993) examined the 
association between PRB liabilities and share prices. The 
sample consisted of firms that offer retiree health plans 
and those that do not, A combined sample included 440 
firms for 1986, 461 for 1987 and 484 for 1988 with 203,
207, and 210 sponsoring retiree health plans, respectively. 
A model was developed regressing market value of common 
stock divided by tangible assets on firm characteristics 
representing research and development expense, advertising 
expense, growth, risk, liabilities, net pension assets, and 
the retiree health liability.
In tests of the health plan sample, the coefficients 
for retiree health liability were significantly negative 
for all three years. The results for the other variables 
were generally consistent with expectations. Regression 
results for the combined sample were similar: a
significant difference between years was found for the 
retiree health liability. The authors concluded that the
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market does value health liabilities, but at an amount that 
may be less than dollar-for-dollar.
The market reaction to SFAS 106 in rate-regulated 
industries was studied by Khurana and Loudder (1994). They 
hypothesized that the unique institutional setting for 
rate-regulated firms implied that a theoretical basis for 
predicting either no market reaction or a positive reaction 
to the proposed standard. No effect may occur because some 
firms may be sheltered from indirect costs by the rate- 
setting process and special external financial reporting 
procedures. A positive reaction may arise as a result of 
investors' perceptions that accounting rules can affect the 
setting of rates causing a positive cash flow.
This study used an interrupted time-series design to 
determine the effects of the Exposure Draft on a sample of 
113 rate-regulated utilities. Industry abnormal return was 
measured for a three-day trading period around the issuance 
of the Exposure Draft. The average abnormal return was 
calculated for each day, then summed for the three days to 
obtain a cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR). The 
weighted portfolio return model (WPRM) of Sefcik and 
Thompson (1986) was used to test cross-sectional 
differences and the relationships between returns and firm- 
specific variables: regulatory environment, leverage,
size, ratio of pay-as-you-go costs to book value of assets,
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and a dummy variable to show if the accrual method of 
accounting for OPEB costs had been used.
The CAAR around the exposure draft issuance was 
negative, but not significant, suggesting that investors in 
regulated industries did not view the proposed rules as 
having any direct or indirect negative cash flow effects, 
contrary to the findings of Espahbodi, Strock, and 
Tehranian (1991). There was a significant negative return 
for firms in environments unfavorable to utilities. The 
authors concluded that the cross-sectional differences in 
investors' reactions suggested that the industry-wide 
response is a combination of "diverse expectation, 
dependent on the expected regulatory action for a given 
f irm" (p. 3 78).
A study by Mittelstaedt, Nichols, and Reiger (1994) 
examined what determines a firm's decision to reduce the 
benefits of retiree health care plans. Their objective was 
to measure the prevalence and magnitude of plan changes and 
to identify cross-sectional and time-varying determinants 
associated with the decisions. They examined five 
hypotheses.
1. Firms that reduce retiree medical coverage 
have higher debt ratios than other firms before 
considering the effects of SFAS 106.
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2. Firms that reduce retiree medical coverage 
have larger increases in debt ratios from SFAS 
106 than other firms prior to reducing coverage.
3. Firms which reduce retiree medical coverage 
experience greater financial weakening than other 
firms prior to reducing coverage.
4. Firms which reduce retiree medical coverage 
experience greater firm-specific increases in 
health care costs than other firms prior to 
reduc i ng coverage.
5. Firms which reduce retiree medical coverage 
have lower pension funding ratios than other 
firms prior to reducing coverage.
A sample of 137 firms with cuts and 327 firms with no 
cuts in retiree health plans was obtained. Types of cuts 
were grouped into five categories: cap employer 
contributions, increase copayment amounts, tie benefits to 
years of service, change to a defined contribution plan, 
and eliminate/reduce benefits. The employee affected were 
grouped into new hires, retirees, fully eligible active 
plan participants, and partially eligible active plan 
participants. The sample was analyzed and the highest 
percentage of change fell in the "reduce benefits, group 
not specified" combination (24.8 percent) and the 
"eliminate benefits for active participants and new hires" 
(13.2 percent). The type of industry appeared to be an 
important determinant of the decision to cut benefits.
Firms in the consumer goods and capital goods industries 
made up 45.3 per cent of the "cut" sample. Overall, more
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than 42 percent of firms within the capital goods and 
transportation industries indicated that cuts had been 
made.
The model included two independent variables to test 
the contracting cost hypotheses (1 and 2): total debt/total 
assets and percentage change in debt caused by the 
immediate recognition of the SFAS 106 liability. The 
financial weakness hypothesis (3) was tested using the 
same debt/asset ratio, cash flow from operations, and 
income from continuing operations, both scaled by total 
assets. Two variables were used to test the increase in 
health care hypothesis (4): retiree pay-as-you-go cost
scaled by active employees and percentage increase from 
prior year pay-as-you-go costs per employee. The variables 
used to test the pension plan funding hypothesis were 
overfunding divided by total assets and a dummy variable 
for the existence of overfunding.
Univariate test results supported the increased 
contracting costs hypotheses with firms that cut benefits 
showing significantly higher leverage and increase in debt. 
The leverage ratio also indicated support for the financial 
weakening hypothesis but the other variables were 
consistent with the hypothesis only for year zero. The 
results for the health care cost hypothesis were mixed and 
there was no support for the pension plan funding
52
hypothesis. Multivariate analysis was performed on the 
same variables using a logit model. The results were 
consistent with those of the univariate tests. The authors 
concluded that retiree health care cuts appeared to be 
driven by increased contracting costs caused by the adverse 
reporting consequences of SFAS 106, financial weakness in 
the absence of SFAS 106, and to a lesser extent, firm-
specific increases in health care costs.
The conclusions from the research on postretirement 
benefits generally supports the positive accounting theory. 
Firm-specific characteristics are shown to be significant 
to the decisions made concerning accounting method choice, 
specifically decisions to adopt SFAS 106 or to reduce plan 
benefits. The transition method chosen has also been shown 
to be a significant factor in managing earnings while 
adopting the new standard.
Conclusion
The purpose of this literature review has been to show 
the progress of research from the general studies of 
positive accounting theory to the more specific 
applications in examining the effects of management choice 
in the case of the adoption of SFAS 106. The three main 
hypotheses of positive accounting relating to management 
compensation (bonus plan), debt covenant, and size 
(political cost) have been generally supported. Various
53
studies have shown that decisions are based on a portfolio 
of information and choices, and that, in each instance, 
variables specific to the accounting choice may be as 
influential as the three variables usually associated with 
theory.
Several limitations can be found in the studies of 
earnings management and positive accounting theory. Most 
authors include evaluations of the problems encountered in 
their own research. Several researchers have presented 
review articles discussing the common problems. McNichols 
and Wilson (1988) show that studies of earnings management 
can produce potentially misleading results under either of 
two conditions: 1. using non-discretionary accruals which
are correlated with the variable used to partition the 
samples and 2. using discretionary accruals measured with 
error.
Shipper (1989) relates these two problems to test bias 
and power. She indicates that bias is the question of 
whether observed results are due to earnings management or 
to the economic conditions that affect the correlation 
between the partitioning variable and discretionary 
accruals. The lack of power will determine whether the 
approach has the ability to detect earnings management 
among the other activity present in the findings.
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Watts and 2immerman (1990) also addressed the lack of
power, attributing it to problems in research methodology
rather than to a deficiency in positive accounting theory.
They identify two major research issues: the lack of power
of the tests and alternative explanations for the empirical
regularities. They make the following observation (p. 143)
The research method issues are important and 
future research must attempt to address them.
However, it is unlikely that the positive 
accounting literature . . .will ever totally 
eliminate such issues.
They do suggest that research can be improved by improving
the linkage between the theory and empirical tests,
developing theoretical and empirical models to sort out
endogeneity problems among the variables and to reduce
♦measurement errors in accruals to increase the test's
power.
Kelly (1983) discussed observation error and 
measurement error in the research studies that she 
reviewed. Observation error arose largely due to the 
difficulties in isolating the effects of systematic 
economic changes. Measurement error occurred because of 
problems in operationalizing independent variables. She 
was optimistic about future research, indicating that 
advancements could be made through theoretical and 
empirical refinements.
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As research continues, improvements are made. Each
study increases the body of knowledge and each makes an
advancement in understanding of positive accounting theory.
Shipper (1989, p 91) directs our thinking as to the purpose
of this research:
By focusing on the costs and benefits of allowing 
for managerial discretion in the choice and 
application of accounting methods, researchers 
provide a framework for considering what we would 
have to give up to eliminate earnings management 
. . . (and facing) the possibility that earnings
management has the essentially beneficial role of 




This chapter develops the research methodology which 
is utilized in this study. This includes discussion of the 
research question and hypotheses development, which is 
based on the literature reviewed in the previous chapter. 
Also included are: the model, the sample selection and the 
data collection methods.
Research Question
The majority of studies reviewed have indicated that 
the existence of, or size of, certain characteristics will 
lead managers to choose accounting methods to meet desired 
goals. By managing earnings, managers can improve their 
personal wealth or the financial position of their firms.
Positive accounting theory says that managers will 
select income increasing accounting methods whenever 
possible to maximize their own wealth (Watts and Zimmerman 
1986). SFAS 106 has been shown to be generally income 
decreasing. By studying the adoption of SFAS 106, which 
gives managers a choice between immediately recognizing the 
transition obligation or amortizing it over a future 
period, the tenets of positive accounting can be tested in 
a reversed, income decreasing, situation.
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The research question is derived from the expectations 
surrounding the issuance of SFAS 106. Since the new 
standard requires recognition of an expense and liability 
that companies would not have recognized until actually 
paid, a new financial burden was created. One obvious 
reaction to the standard was a fear that companies would 
immediately seek to reduce postretirement benefits to 
decrease the cost of plans.
By placing the blame on SFAS 106, companies could use 
the adoption and related financial impact as an excuse to 
decrease the expense and liability of PRB. Since managers 
have a choice of transition methods, they could choose the 
one which would present the best financial position to 
justify the desired changes in plan benefits. The primary 
research question is:
Is there a significant relationship between plan 
amendments and SFAS 106 transition method choice? 
Responses to the research question will add to the body of 
information available as to how managers use accounting 
methods to manage the reported earnings of the firm.
Hypotheses Development 
Eight hypotheses are developed to explore the answers 
to the above research question. The first seven hypothesis 
examine various firm-specific characteristics. The last
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one deals with the issue of plan amendments and transition 
method choice.
Bonus Plan Hypothesis
Management compensation plans are designed to 
provide managers with incentives to maximize firm value and 
improve their personal financial position at the same time. 
Often these compensation contracts specify the payment of a 
bonus based on reported financial earnings. Since the 
adoption of SFAS 106 allowed managers to control the effect 
on the firm's earnings, the presence of a bonus plan might 
have influenced the transition method choice.
The bonus plan hypothesis of positive accounting 
theory contends that managers of firms with income-based 
bonus plans will choose accounting methods that are income- 
increasing. Tests of this hypothesis have yielded mixed 
results. Support was found by Healy (1985); Scott (1991); 
Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) (with the depreciation 
choice); and Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) (Table 3.1). 
These studies found that a variable representing the 
existence of a bonus plan was significant in a model of 
accounting method choice. Healy and Scott tested 
variations of the bonus plan formula, using combinations of 
plans where income limits were observed. They found that 
managers whose firms' income had exceeded the upper or 
lower limits set by the bonus plan contracts were more
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likely to choose income-decreasing accruals than those 
where the bounds were not exceeded.
Bowen, Lacey, and Noreen (1981); Dhaliwal (1982);
Kelly (1983); and Watts and Zimmerman (1978) found 
insignificant results in testing the bonus plan hypothesis. 
Results from these studies were inconclusive as to the 
importance of a bonus plan in managers' choices. They did 
not find support for the theory that managers would seek 
income-increasing accounting methods in the situations 
tested.
Since SFAS 106 does not offer an income-increasing 
situation, the bonus plan hypothesis would suggest that 
managers would seek ways to minimize the effect of the 
standard. The most obvious choice for a manager would be 
to choose the amortization method of recognizing the 
transition obligation to defer much of the expense to 
future periods. However, other research concerning the 
"big bath" effect might contradict this idea.
The "big bath" theory holds that if a firm is going to 
experience a loss in income, then managers will increase 
the loss by including all expected future losses so that 
they can protect future periods' earnings by taking a "big 
bath'* in the current period. The "big bath" theory has 
been explored in both the popular press and academia (See:
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Burton and Miller 1986, Greene 1986, Elliott and Shaw 1988,
among others).
Healy (1985) found support for this theory in
measuring the effect of bonus plan boundaries. He
confirmed that when the lower income limit of a bonus-plan
formula cannot be achieved, managers would desire to take
the "big bath*' and protect future earnings. Scott (1991)
included a variable, BATH, in his model to test the
motivation of managers to take a "bath" in earnings. He
found that this variable was significant to the decision to
adopt SFAS 87 early.
In summary, results of previous research have
generally supported the bonus plan hypothesis, indicating
that managers usually seek income-increasing accounting
methods. However, SFAS 106 is generally income-decreasing,
which should indicate that managers would not have an
incentive to use the adoption to manage earnings, but the
"big bath" theory supplies the reason that managers might
desire to take a large income reduction, such as the
immediate recognition method would provide. Therefore, the
following hypothesis is proposed for this research:
H]: The presence of an income-based bonus plan
is significant to the choice of transition method 
in adopting SFAS 106.
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Eebt Hypothesis
A debt covenant is a controlling mechanism designed to 
protect a debtholder's ownership interest in a firm. These 
covenants place restrictions on management activity after 
debt is issued by a corporation. Often these covenants are 
stated in terms of the reported accounting numbers, such as 
ratio of debt to equity or earnings. Violation of these 
covenants would place a firm in technical default and 
because of this costly result, managers, according to 
positive accounting theory, will choose accounting 
procedures which reduce this possibility. Since 
recognition of the transition liability of SFAS 106 will 
decrease a firm's earnings and increase liabilities, 
managers can exert control over the accounting numbers by 
their selection of transition method and, also, control the 
possibility of default.
The debt hypothesis of positive accounting theory 
suggests that the larger a firm's debt/equity ratio, the 
more likely a manager to choose accounting methods that 
shift earnings to the current period. Begley (1990 p. 126) 
explained that this hypothesis is actually a joint 
hypothesis which ties the debt/equity or leverage ratio to 
a the possibility of default on debt covenants. She 
hypothesized that the debt/equity ratio is positively 
related to closeness to accounting-based covenants, which
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represents the probability of default on these covenants.
As the probability of default increases, the more managers 
are likely to choose income-increasing accounting methods. 
Begley confirmed this with results showing that firms with 
debt covenants based on accounting numbers are more likely 
to select income and asset increasing procedures.
Many early studies supported these theories and 
indicated that leverage was a significant variable in 
managers' accounting method choices. Bowen, Lacey, and 
Noreen (1981); Daley and Vigeland (1983); Dhaliwal (1980, 
1982); and Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) were among the 
early researchers that found support for the debt 
hypothesis (Table 3.2). Kelly (1983) found support when 
testing lobbying activities surrounding implementation of 
foreign currency translation, but no support 
for changes in operating activities. Healy and Palepu
(1990) did not find support for the debt hypothesis when 
testing managers' changes in dividend constraints.
The type of research method used to test the debt 
hypothesis has been the subject of some recent studies. 
Christie (1990) provided three formal statistical test on 
an aggregation of studies of accounting choice: chi-
square, asymptotic and a Bayesian test. He was able to 
conclude that there was support for the debt hypothesis. 
Duke and Hunt (1990) examined the relationship between debt
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covenant restrictions and the debt/equity proxy. They 
found that there was a positive relation between the seven 
debt proxies examined and several common restrictions.
They concluded that a debt-equity ratio was a sufficient 
proxy, especially for capturing a retained earnings 
restr iction.
Research on the debt hypothesis in relation to SFAS 
106 has yielded mixed results. Espahbodi, Strock and 
Tehranian (1991) did not find support a leverage variable 
when testing for market reaction surrounding announcements 
about accounting for postretirement benefits, Amir and 
Livnat in their 1992 study on early adoption of SFAS 106, 
did not find any support. In their 1993 study, they did 
not find support for unexplained liabilities, but they did 
find support for leverage when measuring recontracting 
costs.
In contrast, Sami and Welsh (1992) and Leauby, Ugras, 
and Welsh (1993b) found support for the significance of the 
debt variable in their research concerning early adoption 
of SFAS 106. Warshawsky, Mittelstaedt, and Cristea (1993), 
in their research estimating postretirement benefit 
liability, found that leverage was a significant variable 
between firms sponsoring plans and those which did not* 
Mittelstaedt, Nichols and Reiger (1994) also found the
64
leverage variable to be significant in their study of firms
which made reductions in their postretirement benefits.
The debt hypothesis would indicate that managers would
prefer to report a larger income in the current period. In
adopting SFAS 106, this would best be accomplished by use
of the delayed recognition method. This would allow the
smallest charge to income in the current year. Thus, the
following hypothesis is proposed:
H, : Firms with high leverage will choose the 
delayed recognition method of adopting SFAS 106.
Political Cost Hypotheses
Political costs arise when a regulatory body
influences a firm to take some action, either to avoid
government interference or to meet requirements which have
been imposed. A firm's financial figures play an important
role in the determination of political costs. First, large
figures can send signals to political groups that there are
reasons for politicians to intervene (e.g. to avoid
possible monopoly or to insure social or environmental
responsibility). Second, accounting information is often
used to regulate the firm (such as in setting rates,
imposing new taxes and determining the type of service
offered). By selecting appropriate accounting procedures,
managers are able to send signals to political bodies and
also to manipulate the regulating process. The political
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cost hypothesis, often called the size hypothesis because 
of the frequent use of the size variable as a proxy for 
political cost, indicates that managers will select income- 
decreasing accounting methods to avoid political costs. 
Thus, the managers of larger corporations should choose the 
immediate recognition method of adopting SFAS 106 in order 
to minimize income and avoid political costs.
Several firm specific characteristics have been 
suggested to represent the potential for political costs. 
This research examines firm size, early adoption, and 
industry. These are discussed in the following sections. 
Firm Bis*
The most often examined political proxy is firm size. 
Larger corporations are expected to draw more political 
attention and thus, have more of their income appropriated 
by the system. Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979), in the test 
of depreciation choices, and Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) 
confirmed the hypothesis that large firms face political 
costs which they attempt to minimize by reducing net 
income, in their research on managers' choices of income 
increasing and decreasing accruals. When examining 
inventory choices, Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) did not 
find support.
Watts and Zimmerman (1978), in their study of lobbying 
efforts and general price level adjustment requirements,
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found that firm size had the most discriminating power of 
the variables tested. Bowen, Lacey, and Noreen (1981); 
Daley and Vigeland (1983); Dhaliwal (1980); and Kelly 
(1983) all find support for the significance of size in 
accounting method choice (Table 3.3). Each of these 
studies examines firm specific variables and managers' 
choices and confirm the size hypothesis. However, Dhaliwal 
(1982) found conflicting evidence in his study of managers' 
choices of accounting for interest costs.
In research on adoption of new standards, similar 
results have been found. Sami and Welsh (1992) found that 
early adopters of SFAS 87 were larger in size than those 
that chose to disclose or delay adoption. They 
hypothesized that larger firms are more likely to adopt 
early because they have the resources necessary to 
implement a change. Their results, however, were 
inconsistent with the usual explanation of the political 
cost hypothesis, which indicates that large firms will be 
unlikely to choose income-increasing accounting changes. 
They explained that the results were consistent with those 
obtained by Senteney and Strawser (1990), who found that 
early adopters of SFAS 87 were more likely to be large 
firms with more fully funded plans. Sami and Welsh 
suggested that the information costs and income increasing
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effect are offsetting factors which lead to early adoption 
by large firms.
Since SFAS 106 has income decreasing effects and most 
postretirement (PRB) plans are unfunded, the size 
hypothesis should be supported in tests of adoption. 
Consequently, managers may seek to decrease income to avoid 
political costs, by using the immediate recognition method 
to achieve the maximum possible reduction. Espahbodi, 
Strock and Tehranian (1991) found size to be a significant 
factor in their study of market reaction to announcements 
concerning postretirement benefits,. Warshawsky, 
Mittelstaedt, and Cristea (1993) also found that size was 
important in studying companies that sponsored 
postretirement benefit plans.
Amir and Livnat (1992) did not find support for the 
size hypothesis in their examination of early adopters of 
SFAS 106. They hypothesized that large firms were more 
able to reduce the cost of calculating the necessary 
information needed to adopt and were better able to absorb 
the cost. These firms would be able to reduce political 
costs by reducing earnings and equity. They did find 
significant difference in firm size between early adopters 
and others, however, the sign of the coefficient was 
opposite to their original predictions. Amir and Livnat 
suggested that the impact of adoption on large firms may
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have been financially greater than expected, causing them 
to delay adoption until reviews could be made. This result 
was in line with the pension research (Senteney and 
Strawser 1990) which indicated that the more funded plans 
adopted early and while size was important, the amount of 
unfunded liability caused a reverse action.
The results of pension and PRB research indicate that 
large firms may not adopt early, but that size is 
significant in managers' decisions. The political cost 
hypothesis dictates that managers' will seek to reduce 
costs to avoid political costs, therefore, to achieve 
maximum reduction of income, managers would be expected to 
use the immediate recognition method of adoption of SFAS 
106.
H,: Large firms will choose to immediately
recognize the OPEB transition obligation.
Early Adoption
Although Amir and Livnat (1992) did not find the firm 
size test to yield the expected results, they did find 
other significant results. They argued that the decision 
to adopt SFAS 106 early was related to management's desire 
to "change investors' perceptions" about the financial 
position of the firm. By adopting the standard early, and 
taking immediate write-off of the transition obligation, 
managers intend to convey the healthy state of the firm, as
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well as to avoid political costs. For example, IBM took a 
$2.6 billion earnings write-off in the first quarter of 
1991. Analyst Philip C. Ruepper of Sanford C. Bernstein 
and Co. stated that IBM's move was to show that the ruling 
was "not a big deal for them" (Light, Holland, and Kelly 
1992). When GE announced, in 1991, an aftertax charge of 
$1.8 billion applied to the first quarter earnings, this 
approach seemed successful as stock prices rose by $2 per 
share (Light, Treece, and Driscoll 1991).
Capital markets are expected to see through accounting 
manipulations, including adoption of SFAS 106, when there 
is no effect on cash flow, and share prices should not feel 
the effects. However, Amir and Livnat (1992) found a 
positive market reaction to firms which adopted early over 
those which chose to disclose. This result indicated that 
managers are able to send a positive signal by adopting 
early and taking the immediate write-off of the transition 
obligation. Gujarathi and Hoskin (1992) also found that 
adoption timing plays an important role in earnings 
management. In their study on the adoption of SFAS 96 
(Accounting for Income Taxes), they concluded that firms 
use the timing of adoption, as well as the choice of 
transition method to manage earnings.
Leauby, Ugras, and Welch (1993b) found that transition 
method and timing of adoption were related. In a study,
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which examined only early adopters, they found that 92% of
early adopters used the immediate recognition method. In
another study of early adopters, Amir and Ziv (1994) found
that firms which delayed adoption often incurred more
renegotiation of plan benefits in order to reduce the size
of the liability, indicating that later adopters seek to
postpone recognition of costs.
This research examines a sample of firms which is
selected from all SFAS 106 adopters. The results are
expected to be consistent with previous research which
included only early adopters and disclosers. Firms that
adopted early were expected to reduce income by taking the
largest possible reduction in income through the immediate
recognition method.
H4: Firms which adopt SFAS 106 early will choose
to immediately recognize the OPEB transition 
obligation.
Industry Membership
Membership in certain industries (utilities, 
transportation, etc.) is also associated with political 
costs. These costs may arise as a result of direct 
regulation or of indirect control by political groups over 
the industry. Industries which are regulated by 
governmental agencies will have increased costs as a result 
of direct instruction by the governing bodies as to 
accounting methods to be used or rates to be assessed.
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Indirect regulation may be experienced by some industries 
which arouse public interest because of the product 
involved, the amount of profit earned or activities which 
have been undertaken by the firm (e.g. oil and gas 
companies, automotive, etc.). Costs also arise as a result 
of antitrust activities, union representation, price 
controls, social responsibility pressures and other 
interventions by public interest groups.
Kelly (1983) states that firms in industries which are 
open to political costs would seek income-reducing 
accounting methods. Regulated industries would desire 
income reduction in the hopes of gaining a rate increase, 
while indirectly sensitive industries would seek to reduce 
income in hopes of reducing political costs. Managers of 
politically regulated or politically sensitive firms should 
seek to implement accounting methods which will reduce 
income. In adopting SFAS 106, these managers would be 
expected to choose the immediate recognition method to 
maximize the decrease in income and, thus, political costs.
Research examining the significance of industry 
membership has not been conclusive. Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978) did not find industry to be significant in their 
study of lobbying on general price level adjustment 
requirements. Bowen, Lacey, and Noreen (1981) found 
support for the significance of indirect political costs on
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members of a politically sensitive industry, oil and gas 
companies. They reported that members of this industry 
expensed interest costs while firms in other industries 
capitalized the same costs. Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) 
found that the sign of the maximum likelihood estimator 
(MLE) indicated that firms in more concentrated industries 
(those in which a few firms have a major percentage of 
revenue) tend to adopt accounting strategies which reduced 
net income.
In studies examining the adoption of new standards, 
results have been more consistent. Scott (1991) reported 
that regulated industries did not adopt SFAS 87 early.
This finding was in line with accepted theory that the 
adoption was income-increasing, and that politically 
sensitive industries desired the opposite reaction. Stone 
and Ingram (1988) and Gujarathi and Hoskin (1992) included 
examinations of industry effects in research on early 
adoption of SFAS 87 and SFAS 96, respectively. Both find 
that there are patterns among industries, but the effects 
are not significant to the final models.
Amir and Livnat (1992) found that politically 
regulated firms did not adopt SFAS 106 early. This 
reaction was unusual in that the effect of SFAS 106 is, in 
general, income-reducing. They proposed that this result 
is explained by the nature of the political process of a
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regulated industry. An increase in expense is accepted by 
these firms in hopes of gaining a rate increase. There is 
a time delay in which the firm must petition their 
governing body, and therefore, the regulated firms were not 
in a hurry to adopt a new standard until they had received 
a ruling on rate increases. This theory seems to have been 
confirmed by recent rulings handed down by the FCC and 
public utilities regulating boards stating that companies 
cannot pass increased costs along to their customers 
(Employee Benefit Plan Review 1993, Williams 1993).
Kharana and Loudder (1994) performed a study on the 
market reaction to SFAS 106 in rate-regulated industries to 
see if these firms were protected by the rate-setting 
process. They found a negative, but not significant effect 
for their sample of firms at the issuance of the exposure 
draft. A significantly negative reaction was found for the 
subsample of firms operating in an environment which was 
unfavorable to utilities.
Mittelstaedt, Nichols and Reiger (1994) found 
industry to be a significant factor in their study of firms 
which cut postretirement benefits. Firms in the consumer 
goods and capital goods industries made up 45.3 percent of 
the sample of firms cutting plan benefits. Leauby, Ugras 
and Welsh (1993b) found in their examination of early
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adopters of SFAS 106, that over 60 percent were
manufacturing firms.
These recent studies on the effects of the industry
membership of a firm on the adoption and implementation of
SFAS 106, and other new standards, indicate that the type
of industry may be important to managers' accounting method
decisions. The standard political cost theory states that
managers will seek to reduce income to minimize political
costs. This would indicate that managers, in adopting SFAS
106, would prefer to use the immediate recognition method.
However, in the case of certain industries, there may be
other motivations present. For example, some firms might
seek to take a "big bath" to justify a rate increase, plan
cuts, or to avoid unwanted political attention. Other
firms, knowing that their regulating bodies will not
approve rate increases or plan cuts, might choose to spread
the impact over future periods. For this research, the
following hypothesis is proposed, following the theory of
the political cost hypothesis:
H. : Firms in regulated or politically sensitive 
industries will choose to immediately recognize 
the OPEB transition method in adopting SFAS 106.
Postretirement Benefit Related Hypotheses
SFAS 106 was issued in December of 1990. For most
companies this standard took effect in 1993. Several
researchers have published studies examining the early
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adoption of SFAS 106 (Amir 1993, Espahbodi, Strock and 
Tehranian 1992, Khurana and Loudder 1994, Leauby, Ugras and 
Welsh 1993a and 1993b). In this section, hypotheses 
directly related to SFAS 106 and postretirement benefits 
are addressed.
Work Fore* Maturity
Espahbodi, Strock and Tehranian (1991) examined the 
impact on equity prices of nine pronouncements related to 
the proposed standard on PRB. Their study indicated that 
the market showed a significant reaction only on the date 
of the issuance of the exposure draft. The negative 
abnormal returns were most pronounced for firms with few 
retirees relative to current employees, along with high 
leverage, small size and firms using the cash basis of 
reporting PRB. They concluded that the maturity of the 
work force was important to investors.
A firm with a more mature work force (more retirees 
than current employees) may face a greater impact from SFAS 
106, than a firm with a less mature work force. This may 
occur because the amount which had been earned by and 
promised to the retirees over their active work period had 
never previously been recognized on financial statements. 
The liability for current employees is incurred as they 
work and will be recognized over their employment period. 
Thus, a firm with a mature work force may choose to
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amortize the transition obligation to spread the impact 
over future periods.
On the other hand, a mature work force may indicate a 
mature firm. A mature firm may have been in business for 
many years and have a stable financial situation. The 
mature firm may be in a position to absorb the entire 
transition obligation at once by using the immediate 
recognition method.
Since the research by Espahbodi, Strock and Tehranian
(1991) showed that work force maturity was important to 
investors, then it may also be important to managers in 
making their transition method choice. There is no 
previous research or theory to imply the direction that a 
manager is expected to take, so a two-tailed hypothesis is 
presented.
H, : Work force maturity will be a significant
factor in a manager's choice of transition method 
in the adoption of SFAS 106.
Statement of Financial Accounting standards No. 109
The obligation to report OPEB and the potential for 
future funding of the benefits will have an effect on 
related income tax accounting. The FASB has again revised 
the method of accounting for deferred taxes in Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 109 (SFAS 109), 
Accounting for Income Taxes. This statement has been 
referred to as the companion to SFAS 106 (Ourusoff and
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Panchapakesan 1992). While SFAS 106 requires employers to 
account for the future cost of PRB as services are 
performed, instead of when cash is paid, SFAS 109 allows 
employers to offset the liabilities with a deferred tax 
asset.
Allan and Surdick (1993) examined the effects of SFAS 
109 on SFAS 106. They rationalized that if an employer 
elects immediate recognition of the PRB transition amount, 
the deferred tax asset reported on the balance sheet will 
reflect the full tax impact at the date of adoption, thus 
making this a very significant asset, in terms of the 
dollar amount. Companies which record large expenses, 
relative to cash outlay, may benefit from adopting SFAS 
109, particularly if they have no taxable differences to 
offset (Wilson 1992). Managers may choose to adopt SFAS 
109 at the same time as adopting SFAS 106 in order to 
manage the earnings.
If a manager can benefit by adopting SFAS 109 to the 
extent of the transition expense, the immediate write-off 
method might be chosen. The following hypothesis is 
proposed:
H : Firms adopting SFAS 109 in the same year as 
SFAS 106 will use the immediate recognition 
method in adopting SFAS 106.
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Plan Amendments
A survey by A. Foster Higgens, a consulting firm, 
found that many corporations used SFAS 106 as an excuse to 
cut their retiree benefits (Cameron 1992). Two-thirds of 
major corporations have already curtailed retiree health 
plans or plan to do so, with more raising premiums, 
deductibles or eligibility rules. Over one-third were 
making changes primarily to reduce their liability under 
SFAS 106 (Cameron 1992). Potential changes include: 1)
Different eligibility requirements, 2) Different provisions 
for dependent coverage, and 3) A link in the level of 
benefits to an employee's years of service at retirement 
(Beck and Cohen 199 3).
Another survey by William M. Mercer, Inc. indicated 
that 50 per cent of the surveyed firms are increasing 
employee contributions, 34 per cent have tightened 
eligibility standards, and 26 per cent have caps on company 
contributions (Geisel 1993). A 1992 survey by Towers 
Perrin showed that 37 per cent have changed healthcare plan 
provisions to require more out-of-pocket expenses from 
future retirees and 28 per cent have already taken similar 
action for current retirees (HR Focus 1992). Other results 
reported that while companies were in agreement that plan 
changes would be needed 78 per cent had not decided how to 
manage the transition obligation (Cameron 1992).
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Amir and Livnat (1994) examined early adopters to 
determine if there was a delay in adopting SFAS 106 due to 
attempt to renegotiate PRB costs. They suggested that if 
management was successful in renegotiations, then future 
cash outflows for PRB would be reduced and the negative 
effects on the financial statements would be smaller.
There would be additional cost, however, in benefits given 
up to offset the renegotiation, (e.g. Some firms in the 
sample gave stock options to employees as compensation for 
a reduction of postretirement benefits.) The managers 
would possibly be able to replace an obligation which must 
be recognized with an off-balance sheet obligation. They 
confirmed their hypothesis in finding that 1992 adopters 
had been more active in renegotiating plan benefits with 
employees than 1991 adopters.
Amir and Ziv (1992) also examined renegotiation costs. 
They hypothesized that firms waiting until the mandatory 
adoption date were more likely to renegotiate than those 
adopting early and that the PRB of renegotiating firms was 
higher than those not attempting to renegotiate. The 
results confirmed that renegotiation of plan benefits in 
order to reduce the size of the liability did occur more 
frequently among the firms which delayed adoption than 
among early adopters or disclosers. They also found that
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firms delaying adoption had the largest PRB liability of
the three groups in the sample.
Hittelstaedt, Nichols and Reiger (1994) examined why a
firm chose to amend their PRB plan. Their results
indicated that plan cuts were driven by increased
contracting costs as a result of adverse reporting
consequences of SFAS 106. Also the presence of financial
weakness prior to adopting SFAS 106 and to a lesser extent,
health care cost increases of the firm were shown to be
part of the cause for plan cuts.
These studies indicate that the effects of adopting
SFAS 106 have a major influence on the decision to make
changes in PRB plans. By choosing a one-time write-off
which maximizes the decrease in income, managers could, in
effect, create a situation which allows them the
opportunity to make cuts in employee benefits while not
taking the full blame. These plan amendments would reduce
future benefits to employees and leave more income to the
possible benefit of the managers. To create the maximum
expense from the adoption, managers would choose the
immediate recognition method for the transition obiigation.
The following hypothesis is proposed.
H„: Firms which have amended their nonpension
postretirement benefit plan will use the
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immediate recognition method of adopting SFAS
106.
Research Model
Firm-specific characteristics for firms choosing 
alternative methods of recognizing the OPEB transition 
method in the adoption of SFAS 106 is evaluated using the 
following model:
TRANS = b + b, (LEV) + b (BON) + b.(SIZE) +
b4 (ADOPT) + b. (IND) + b. (RET) + b (109) + 
b(AMEND) ■+ e.
where:
Trans = a dichotomous variable where a 1 
indicates that the firm used the 
immediate recognition method to expense 
the OPEB transition obligation, 0 
indicates that the delayed recognition 
method was selected.
Bonus plan hypothesis variable
BON = a dummy variable where a l indicates the
existence of an income-based bonus plan, a 
0 indicates no such plan is in place.
Debt hypothesis variable
LEV = ratio of long-term debt to stockholder's 
equ ity;
Political cost hypotheses variables
The variable SIZE is represented by two different 
proxies tested in separate models:
Details of the types of plan amendments will be 
collected for further descriptive study and analysis.
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ASSET = log of total assets in the year of adoption of 
SFAS 106.
PLANSIZE = the amount of the transition
obligation/stockholders' equity of the 
f irm.
The other political cost variables are represented as 
follows:
ADOPT = a dummy variable where a 1 indicates early 
adoption of SFAS 106, a 0 indicates timely 
adoption.
IND = a dummy variable where a l indicates membership 
in a regulated or politically sensitive 
industry, 0 indicates otherwise.
Postretirement related variables
RET = a ratio of retirees to current employees
109 = a dummy variable where 1 indicates the
concurrent adoption of SFAS 109, o indicates 
otherwise.
PIan amendment variable
AMEND = a dummy variable where 1 indicates that a
postretirement benefit plan amendment has been
announced within a six month window of adoption 
of SFAS 106, o indicates otherwise.
Variable Selection
The bonus plan hypothesis variable, BON, is adopted 
after analyzing previous research. Since the size of the 
transition obligation is a material amount for most firms, 
the effect on the boundaries should be similar for most 
firms that have plans, thus the dummy variable is used 
instead of a range of variables describing plan
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boundaries.1 Information concerning bonus plans is 
derived from reviewing data bases (National Automated 
Accounting Research System [NAARS], Disclosure) and proxy 
statements where applicable. The expected sign on BON is 
not predicted at this point.
The debt hypothesis variable, LEV, is selected after 
reviewing those used in previous studies. LEV is a measure 
of a firm’s leverage. Leverage has been shown to be a 
proxy for a firm's closeness to violation of debt 
covenants. Duke and Hunt (1990) and Press and Weintrop
(1990) demonstrated this relationship in two respects.
They showed that leverage has a relationship to the 
existence of accounting-based covenants and that leverage 
is also related to closeness to default on some types of 
covenants.
Accounting information to calculate the leverage ratio 
is collected from COMPUSTAT. The expected sign of LEV is 
negative. This is predicted because firms with high 
leverage and possible covenant violation would be expected 
to avoid immediate recognition of the transition obligation 
expense.
1 The income/loss results of the transition method 
choice will be examined as well with the possible inclusion 
of another dummy variable to represent these effects.
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The potential existence of political costs is 
represented by several variables. The political cost 
hypothesis indicates that the size of the firm is expected 
to be significant to the accounting choice decision. Two 
size variables are proposed: ASSET and PLANSIZE. ASSET is 
measured using the log of total assets, as used by Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986) and more recently by Amir and Livnat
(1992) .
The use of a measure of the size of the plan, itself, 
PLANSIZE, is included to represent a different proxy for 
the size of the firms which is specific to the proposed 
research questions. Sami and Welsh (1992) included the 
pension plan obligation (ABOSIZE) as a surrogate for firm 
size. They found that this variable was significant to the 
decision to adopt SFAS 87 early. Amir and Livnat (1992, 
1994) found that the size of the OPEB liability was also 
significant in the decision to adopt SFAS 106 early.
The amount of the transition obligation is divided by 
the firm's stockholder's equity to give a more comparable 
measure of the size of the plan in relation to other firms. 
ASSET is acquired from COMPUSTAT data. PLANSIZE is taken 
from the annual report of the year of adoption from NAARS. 
The expected sign of both proxies for firm size is 
positive.
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ADOPT is a dichotomous variable indicating whether 
SFAS 106 was adopted early. Bell and Bible (1987) and 
Gujarathi and Hoskin (1992) found research results which 
supported the relationships between adoption timing and 
choice of transition method in earnings management. The 
adoption date is available in annual report information on 
NAARS. The expected sign is positive.
Membership in regulated or politically sensitive 
industry is determined by SIC code and industries which 
have been determined by previous research as regulated and 
politically sensitive. Bowen, Lacey, and Noreen (1981) 
included the oil and gas industry. Amir and Livnat (1992) 
used utilities and financial institutions. Khurana and 
Loudder (1994) examined rate-regulated utilities. Scott
(1991) further defined regulated as all firms with more 
than 50% of their revenues from specified lines of 
business: telephone, electric and gas utilities,
interstate gas distributors, and defense contractors. All 
of these are included along with transportation and the 
food industry. The expected sign is positive.
The variable RET was used by Espahbodi, Strock, and 
Tehranian (1981) to measure the maturity of a firm's work 
force. They suggested the ratio of retirees to current 
employees, which is suggested here. In order to acquire 
the information, they contacted personnel offices of the
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firms in their sample. Amir (1993) used the ERISA-Blue 
Book of Pension Funds to obtain the number of retirees and 
the annual reports for the current number of employees.
The NAARS and CD Disclosure data bases and US Department of 
Labor Forms 5500 are used to obtain this information in 
addition manual collection where necessary.
Footnotes to the annual reports on NAARS and CD 
Disclosure reveal when a firm adopted SFAS 109. A dummy 
variable is used to indicate if SFAS 109 was adopted in the 
same year as SFAS 106. The expected sign is positive.
Since the presence of a plan amendment occurring near 
the adoption of SFAS 106 may indicate that managers of a 
firm are manipulating the earnings to achieve a desired 
result, namely the reduction of PRB costs, a dichotomous 
variable is included. Plan changes are found in footnotes 
to the annual reports, proxy statements or in search of 
press releases or other announcements. The expected sign 
is positive.
Sample Selection
A sample of public firms is taken from COMPUSTAT for 
years 1989 to 1994. The f irms are selected by retrieving 
those with information corresponding to the desired 
variables listed above. The sample is reduced by further 
retrieval of information on NAARS and CD DISCLOSURE data 
bases. A preliminary search of NAARS revealed 2731 firms
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showing adoption of SFAS 106 in their footnotes through 
June 30, 1993. (Although some of these may have been
duplicates in the data base, the sample size appeared to be 
very large.):
Statistical Analysis
Logit analysis is used to test the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables in this 
model. Logit has been shown to have several advantages 
over ordinary least squares regression (OLS) in a model 
using a dichotomous dependent variable (Stone and Rasp 
1991, Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner 1989). Using the 
nonlinear cumulative logistic probability function, logit 
automatically produces probability estimates that fall 
between zero and one.
One condition that must be considered in the use of 
Logit is sample size. Stone and Rasp (1991) found that 
sample sizes of 200 or more are necessary to ensure that 
the nominal and empirical error rates will not be 
significantly different. Aldrich and Nelson (1984) 
suggested that 50 cases per parameter will ensure that 
parameters will be unbiased in their estimates. When bias 
appears because of a small sample size, the t-tests will
Cursory examination of a sample of early adopters on 
NEXIS, through 1992, indicated 76 firms would use 
amortization and 216 would immediately recognize the 
transition obligation.
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have an anticonservatively biased result. Since SFAS 106 
is required of all companies with postretirement plans, 
acquiring a sample of significant magnitude should not be a 
problem. Preliminary examination of early adopters (as of 
June 30, 1993) yielded a sample of 216 firms selecting
immediate recognition and 75 selecting delayed recognition.
Univariate tests are conducted on the variables. The 
variables are tested using Chi-square analysis, as well as 
correlation tests. Transformations are examined where 
indicated, possibly in the SIZE variables. T-tests or 
Wilcoxon tests are performed to examine interaction between 
variables as some is expected, especially among the 
political cost variables. Potential relationships between 
the workforce maturity variable and the plan amendments, 
and between early adopters and industry variables are 
analyzed. Where necessary, the model is expanded and 
observations are deleted as the exploratory results 
indicate.
Expected Contributions
Previous research concerning SFAS 106 concentrates on 
the characteristics and choices made by early adopters, as 
well as market reaction to early adoption. This research 
examines the effects of having a choice of transition 
methods using firm characteristics of a sample of all 
companies with postretirement benefits which have adopted
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the statement, both early adopters and those which adopted 
at the mandatory adoption date. The model tests for 
significance of the variables to indicate which firm 
characteristics are important in the selection of 
accounting methods.
Previous research on firm-specific variables has 
yielded mixed results. The attached tables display the 
results of research on the bonus plan, debt, and size 
hypotheses as well as research on postretirement benefits. 
Four out of the eight bonus plan studies listed indicated 
support for the hypothesis, 11 of the 14 debt hypothesis 
studies indicated support, and all but three of the 12 size 
hypothesis studies indicated that there is support for this 
hypothesis. The postretirement studies indicated support 
for these hypothesis, but frequently revealed conflicting 
or unexpected results and ambiguities, depending upon the 
nature of the study and the variables selected. The 
results of this research attempt to add clarification to 
previously inconclusive research results on the standard 
hypotheses of positive accounting theory using the 
transition method choice of SFAS 106, and to extend and 
confirm the research which has shown that managers do take 
opportunities to manage the earnings and influence 
investors with the adoption of a new standard.
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While results of the traditionally studied hypotheses 
add to the body of information in existence, a new area is 
contributed by testing data specific to the postretirement 
related hypothesis. Published research on SFAS 106, up to 
this time, has concentrated primarily on studies of early 
adopters and disclosers. Tests of firm-specific variables 
have been done to determine differences between firms 
choosing to adopt early and those choosing to wait. 
Researchers have found several significant variables, but 
the results have also shown some areas of conflicting 
results (See Table 3.4). Other studies have examined the 
market effects of SFAS 106 and related announcements on 
firm share prices. This research uses more recent data to 
present new information, by selecting a sample from all 
firms which have adopted SFAS 106 since its announcement 
date. Also by examining the relationships between maturity 
of the workforce, the concurrent adoption of SFAS 109, use 
of plan amendments, and the transition method selected, new 
variables are introduced and new information is made 
available, and relationships are tested which have not 
previously been examined. Future research concerning new 
statements and their adoptions will be able to benefit from 
this.
Accounting information is intended to communicate 
information about the financial position of the firm. The
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FASB, along with other regulatory bodies, promulgate 
statements and guidelines to aid the communication process. 
Accounting standards have, in recent years, been used to 
address social issues as well. Both SFAS 87 and SFAS 106 
appear to be part of the attempt to provide security for 
employees (as well as other stakeholders of the firm) and 
seem to fall into place with the trends experienced in the 
political arena at this time.
This role of the FASB has been questioned. Some 
concerned individuals feel that the FASB is charged with 
maintaining usability and representativeness of financial 
statements and not public policy setting (Sweeney 1993).
In an attempt to make accounting numbers representative of 
reality, as in the case of pension and postretirement 
benefits, the FASB will potentially affect millions of 
workers. Thus, by addressing accounting issues they are 
able to dictate social policy with great economic 
consequences.
By providing method choices which allow managers to 
adjust reported numbers to their own benefits, the FASB can 
transfer the responsibility of these consequences to 
manager. Sunder(1988) discussed the FASB's role as policy 
setter and suggested that perhaps they should assume some 
modesty with respect to their ability to devise new 
accounting methods which create "socially preferred
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standards". This research attempts to explore the area of 
earnings management and the effect on new standards. The 
FASB should take into account the results of this and other 
related research in decision making concerning the adoption 
of new standards and the actual results achieved.
CHAPTER 4
Results
Results of this research provide interesting new 
information concerning the three PRB related variables: 
RETEMP, 109, and AMEND. RETEMP and 109 were shown to be 
significant to the transition method choice decision, while 
AMEND was not significant, but had a sign opposite to 
expectations. Confirmation was also obtained for the bonus 
theory and some aspects of the political cost theory.
The first section of this chapter discusses the sample 
selection; the second section provides descriptive 
statistics of the variables used; logistic regression 
results are reported in the third section; and the 
predictive ability of the model is analyzed in the fourth 
section. The results are summarized in the last section of 
the chapter. Tables and appendices are included or 
referenced where appropriate.
Sample Selection
The logistic regression model used in this research 
contained eight independent variables, thus, a sample size 
of 2 00 observations, providing over twenty observations per 
variable, was the desired goal. Criteria for inclusion in
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the study were: 1) existence of postretirement plans and
adoption of SFAS 106, and 2) availability of the required 
financial and corporate data for each variable included in 
the model. Using these criteria, the initial sample was 
collected in a two step process.
Selection of a sample, for which financial information 
was readily available, began with a list of publicly traded 
companies drawn from Standard and Poor's Compustat 
(COMPUSTAT) annual data base. A total of 2,467 firms 
listing a Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code and 
reported amounts for stockholder's equity, total 
liabilities, current liabilities and total assets was 
selected. From these firms, 733 firms were randomly 
selected for review to determine their status of adoption 
of SFAS 106.
The Lexis-Nexis (NAARS) data base was used to examine 
the annual reports for fiscal years 1990-1994 (the most 
current period available). ’ Of these, 211 indicated the 
existence of a postretirement benefit plans and adoption of 
SFAS 106 between the years 1990 and 1993. Table 4.1
'The Exposure Draft on postretirement benefits was 
issued in 1989. SFAS 106 was issued in December 1990. The 
statement required, with few exceptions, that companies 
adopt the provisions for fiscal years beginning after 
December 1992. However, as companies became aware of the 
FASB's increased interest in this area, some began 
adopting the required provisions earlier than the 
prescribed deadlines.
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presents the breakdown of the sample by adoption year. One 
firm adopted SFAS 106 in Fiscal Year (FY) 1990, sixteen in 
FY 1991. Seventy-eight adopted in FY 1992 and 101 adopted 
in 1993.14
Table 4.1 
Sample Breakdown By Adoption Year






Searches of annual reports, proxy statements and press 
releases on NAARS, for these 211 firms yielded data for all 
but one variable. Information concerning the number of 
retirees and employees for each firm in the sample was 
obtained from a review of US Department of Labor Annual 
Report forms 5500 compiled by Judy Diamond Associates, Inc. 
Fifteen firms, lacking this data, were eliminated. The 
final sample size was 196 firms (See Appendix A).
' 4Of this 101, five indicated that this was an early 
adoption. Their determination was used to include them in 
the early adoption group for the variable EARLY, thus 
yielding the breakdown of 100 early and 96 timely adopters.
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Descriptive Statistics
This section contains a general description of the 
overall characteristics of the sample firms. The following 
section will discuss the characteristics of the firms in 
greater detail, broken down by dependent and independent 
variables, with results of univariate analysis. Table 4.2 
displays the mean and range for the continuous variables 
collected for each firm, which is used for ratio 
calculation. Table 4.3 gives the mean and range for the 
actual ratios calculated for the continuous variables and 
the frequencies of occurrence for the indicator variables.
Several financial variables were used in this research 
to calculate the two size proxies; transition obligation, 
stockholder’s equity, and total assets. The mean amount of 
the transition obligation recognized in adopting SFAS 106, 
for the firms in this sample, was $479.02 million. The 
range for the entire sample was from $.34 to $13,940 
million. Since the largest transition obligation caused by 
adoption of SFAS 106, reported by General Motors, was $25 
billion, the observations in this sample appear to cover a 
good portion of the population spectrum.
The mean amount of stockholder's equity was $1,746.72 
million. The range of stockholder's equity was from 
-$232.72 million to $21,683.00 million. The range of 
Fortune 500 companies for 1993 (the most often selected
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adoption year) was from -$2080.9 to 34,792.0 million 
(Teitelbaum 1994). (The Fortune 500 is selected from a 
population of publicly traded firms and represents the 
highest ranked companies by Fortune magazine.) Eight of 
the sample firms had negative stockholder's equity, out of 
196 observations (4.1%). (Twenty-two of the Fortune 500 
firms had negative stockholder's equity values (4.4%).) 
Table 4.4 presents a list of these eight firms along with 
the amount of net income for the year of adoption, 
transition obligation, and transition method choice. Of 
these eight, all had negative income for the year of 
adoption. All firms, except Ceridian Corp. and National- 
Standard had negative stockholder's equity greater than the 
amount of the year's net loss, indicating a negative 
balance from the previous year. All but two firms, Raytech 
Corp. and United Merchants and Mfrs (UM&M), had net losses 
surpassing the amount of the transition obligations, which 
meant that these firms had net losses before including the 
write off of the transition obligation. Raytech and UM&M 
would have had a positive net income if they had not chosen 
to recognize the entire transition obligation. However, 
Raytech and UM&M had negative stockholder's equity prior to 
adoption of SFAS 196, indicating that they were already in 
questionable financial standing. With only one of the 




Variable Mean (Std.Dev) Range
TRANSOB TS :* 479.03 (1527.48) 0.34-13940.00
($ MILLIONS) IR 610.30 (153 . 06) 0.43-13940.00
DR 166.68 (34.91) 0.34- 1079.00
SE TS 1746.72 (3105.52) -232.72-21683.00
($ MILLIONS) IR 1849.59 (282.81) -232.72-21683.00
DR 1502.12 (331.64) -45.29-17144.00
TOTASS TS 7906.81 (20280.00) 20.44-186933.00
($ MILLIONS) IR 7225.27 (1499.58) 20.44-168259.00
DR 9528.42 (3366.42) 40.60-186933.00
LTLIAB TS 1636.42 (00.50) 0.00-24577.00
($ MILLIONS) IR 1761.44 (3815.49) 0.49-24577.00
DR 1338.97 (2697.24) 0.00-14115.00
RETIREES TS 3925.76 (11030.00) 0.00- 90832.00
(PERSONS) IR 4895.96 (12865.89) 0.00- 90832.00
DR 1617.33 (3262.46) 0.00- 16028.00
EMPLOYEES TS 19626.00 (37130.00) 8.00-2603 59.00
(PERSONS) IR, 24892.47 (42741.74) 8.00-260359.00
DR 7094.17 (10031.66) 196.00- 59599.00
TS= Total Sample (196 firms),
IR= Immediate Recog (138 firms), 















































.31 (0.98) 0.00-12.53 
.32 (1.08) 0.00-12.53 
.31 (0.68) 0.00- 4.88





















0= no amendments 
1= amendments
BONUS
(firm has bonus plan)
11/185 0=no bonus plan 
l=bonus plan
TS= Total Sample (196 firms), DR= Delayed Recog (58 
firms), IR= Immediate Recog (138 firms),
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Table 4.4
Firms With Negative Stockholders' Equity 
($ Millions)
Name SE Net Trans. Trans.
Inc. Oblig. Meth.
1 = IR, 0=DR
Arc International -10.29 -4 . 92 2 .25 1
Ceridian Corp -100.00 -392.00 55.80 1
Everest and Jennings -30.80 -18.91 . 49 1
Interlake Corp -232.72 -2 7.07 14 . 04 1
National-Standard -24.83 -53.38 48 . 68 1
Raytech Corp -5.86 -4 . 75 5. 97 1
United Merchants 
and Mfrs. -34 . 14 -0.75 15.30 1
Genrad Inc. -45.29 -43.80 12 . 09 0
method, this table gives appearance of a tendency toward 
the "big bath" theory for firms with negative stockholder's 
equity.
The mean amount of total assets was $7,906.81 million 
with a range from $20.44 million to $186,93.00 million.
(The range for the Fortune 500 was $143.9 million to 
$251,506 million, the median value was $1,512 million. The 
range of this sample was lower, indicating the possibility 
that some smaller firms were selected.) Firm debt was 
represented by long-term debt, with a mean value of 
$1,636.42 million with a range from $0.00 to
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$24,566.00 million. The mean number of retirees for the 
sample was 3,925.76 with a range from 0.00 to 90,832.00.
The mean number of employees was 19,626.00 with a range 
from 8.00 to 260,359.00.
Sample firms came from 122 industry classifications 
(See Appendix A). The sample was divided into two industry 
groups, regulated and non-regulated. Regulated companies 
were defined as those in banking/financial, communications, 
transportation, and utilities industries. These were 
identified by SIC codes beginning with either four or six. 
The most freguently represented SIC codes are shown in 
Table 4.5. Firms classified as regulated totaled 56 with 
140 classified as unregulated. This indicates an almost 3 
to 1 ratio of unregulated to regulated firms in the sample, 
however, among the regulated firms, there was more 
concentration within a SIC code, with 6712 and 4931 the 
most represented.
One hundred of the sample firms adopted SFAS 106 
early, as evidenced by the adoption date or indicated in 
the footnotes. Ninety-six were categorized as timely 
adopters. SFAS 109 was adopted in the same year by the 
remaining 56. Postretirement benefit plan amendments were 
announced by 55 sample firms, while 141 did not announce 
amendments within the specified window of time. Only 11 of
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the sample firms did not indicate the existence of a bonus 
plan, with 185 firms having a plan.
Table 4.5 












There are roughly three to one ratios for three of the 
descriptive characteristics examined. Industry 
(Unregulated/regulated), concurrent 109 adoption 
(concurrent/non-concurrent) and amendments (no 
amendments/announced amendments). The issue of early 
adoption is almost evenly split, 100 early and 96 timely, 
the only characteristic indicating an extremely lopsided 




Firms were divided into two groups based on the method 
used to recognize the transition obligation (TMETH). Of
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the 196 sample firms, 138 (70.4 percent) chose to recognize 
the entire transition obligation in the year of adoption as 
a cumulative effect of an accounting change. These firms 
are referred to as the immediate recognition (IR) firms. 
Fifty-eight firms (29.6 percent) chose to amortize the 
obligation over a future period and disclosed the entire 
obligation only in the footnotes. These are referred to as 
the delayed recognition (DR) firms. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 
display the mean and range of financial variables as well 
as the frequencies of indicator variables for IR and DR 
groups. These are discussed in detail in the following 
section.
The independent variables
In order to examine how the choice of transition 
method is affected by firm specific variables and to answer 
the primary research question as to the relationship 
between plan amendments and transition method choice, nine 
independent variables were analyzed to test the eight 
hypotheses presented in Chapter Three, (Two variables were 
used to test the size hypothesis; PLANSIZE, transition 
obligation/stockholder's equity - a scaled measurement of 
the size of a firm's plan and ASSET, a log of total assets, 
Use of two different size variables is designed to test the 
differing effects of using absolute size (assets of the 
company) versus a relative measure of a firm's
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postretirement benefit plan, a variable pertinent to the 
research question. A firm's size ranking may differ in 
relation to the other sample firms depending on the size 
measure used.)
Univariate analysis was conducted by performing t- 
tests on each continuous variable (LEV, PLANSIZE, ASSET, 
and RETEMP) to determine if the means of the two 
independent groups, based on the choice of transition 
obligation method (IR and DR), were significantly 
different. If results indicated that the null hypothesis 
- that the means were the same - could be rejected, the 
variable was assumed to have a significant influence on the 
transition method choice. Similarly, Chi Square analysis 
was conducted on the binomial variables (SIC, BONUS, ADOPT, 
109, and AMEND) to determine the association of these firm 
characteristics with transition method choice. This test 
uses the null hypothesis that there is no association 
between the test variable and the dependent variable. 
Results of the Chi Square test measure the strength of the 
evidence that an association exists, but do not indicate 
the strength of the association (SAS Institute Inc. 1994). 
T-test results for the continuous variables (LEV, PLANSIZE,
Unless otherwise indicated all statistical tests 
were performed on the SAS System, which test the hypothesis 
that the means of two independent groups are equal.
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ASSET, and RETEMP) are reported in Table 4.6. The results 
of Chi Square analysis for the binomial variables (SIC, 
BONUS, ADOPT, 109, and AMEND) are displayed in Table 4-7. 
The following sub-sections detail analysis of each variable 
with a summary discussion at the conclusion.
Table 4.6
Test of Equal Means (Continuous Variables)
Variable DF t-stat p-value
LEV 188 . 7 -.0734' . 9415
PLANSIZE 70.4 .8867' . 3782
ASSET 194 . 0 1.2190 .2243
RETEMP 165. 2 -.0783* .9377
indicates use of t-test for unequal variances
Leverage
Hypothesis Four was developed to test whether high 
leverage is related to the choice of delayed recognition of 
the transition obligation. A ratio of a firm's non-current 
liabilities to stockholder's equity (LEV) was used to 
represent the debt position of the sample firms (See Table 
4.3). The mean for the total sample of 196 firms was 1.25. 
The mean for the IR firms was 1.13 and for the DR firms was 
1.11. The range was from a minimum of -9.7 1 to 36.472.
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As previously discussed, eight of the sample firms had 
negative stockholder's equity causing negative LEV values 
(See Table 4.4). Firms facing financial distress (as 
exemplified by negative SE values might be expected to have
Table 4.7
Frequency Analysis (Indicator Variables)
Variable Chi-square (DF=1) p-value
SIC 65.862 . 000‘
BONUS 6 . 483 .011*
ADOPT 50.014 . 000'
109 1.410 . 235
AMEND . 628 .428
significant at alpha < . 05
debt problems as well. Four of the eight distressed firms 
have LEV values greater than one standard deviation from 
the mean. (Univariate tests were conducted both with these 
eight firms included and excluded. Their exclusion yielded 
results similar to those obtained using the entire sample, 
so only the testing of the entire sample is discussed.)
To test for a significant difference between the means 
of the two groups a t-test was conducted. To determine 
whether an exact or approximate t-test should be used, an
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F-test was first conducted. The F-test for equal variances 
resulted in a p=value of .0000, which indicated that the 
null hypothesis of equal variances should be rejected and 
an approximate t-test assuming unequal variances was used. 
The approximate t-test yielded a statistic of -.0734 with 
a p-value of .9415 which denoted that the means could not 
be assumed to be different between the two groups. (See 
Table 4.7.) Based on the univariate analysis, there does 
not appear to be any significant differences between firms 
choosing immediate or delayed recognition of the transition 
method based on debt structure. This result does not 
support the traditional debt hypothesis, as had been 
expected.
Firm Bis*
According to positive accounting theory, firm size is 
one representative of political cost. The larger a firm, 
the more visibility it may have and the more attention may 
be received from political bodies. To test Hypothesis 
Three, the effect of firm size (representing political 
cost) on the transition method choice, two measures of firm 
size were used. Each of these variables characterized one 
aspect of the relative size of the firm. The first was a 
ratio (PLANSIZE) of the amount of the transition obligation 
(TRANSOB) to total stockholder's equity (SE). (See Table 
4.3.) The mean transition obligation for the total sample
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was $479.03 million (See Table 4.2) with a range from $.34 
million to a maximum of $13,940 million. The mean for the 
IR group was $610.3 million and for the DR group was $166.7 
million. The mean of the ratio PLANSIZE for the entire 
sample was .832 (See Table 4.3) with a range of -1.96 to 
38.48. (The existence of negative values for stockholder's 
equity of eight firms caused negative values of PLANSIZE. 
(See Table 4.4) PLANSIZE for all of the eight firms fell 
within one standard deviation of the sample mean.) The 
mean for the IR group was .602 and 1.380 for the DR group.
An approximate t-test was conducted to test the 
hypothesis that the means of the two independent groups was 
the same. (An F-test for equal variances for PLANSIZE 
yielded a p-value of .0000, indicating that variances were 
unequal and thus an approximate t-test assuming unequal 
variances was conducted.) The t-test yielded a statistic 
of .8867 and gave a p-value of ,3782 (See Table 4-6), which 
indicated that the null hypothesis, the means of the two 
groups are equal, could not be rejected. There does not 
appear to be a significant difference between firms 
choosing immediate and delayed recognition methods based on 
size of the plan relative to the firm's equity. This 
result does not confirm the political cost (size) 
hypothesis unlike previous research studies.
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The second variable used to represent firm size, 
(ASSET), was the log of a firm's total assets (TOTASS).
The mean of the total assets (TOTASS) of all firms in the 
sample was $7,906.8 million (See Table 4.2), with a range 
from $20.4 to $186,933 million. The mean of the log, 
ASSET, was 7.50 with a range from 3.03 to 12.14. The mean 
for the IR group was 7.74 and the mean for the DR group was 
7.40 (See Table 4.3).
The F-test for ASSET resulted in a p-value of .7768, 
indicating that the null hypothesis of equal variances 
could not be rejected, thus an exact t-test assuming equal 
variance was used to test if the means of the two groups 
were equal. This t-test gave a t-statistic of 1.2190 and a 
p-value of .2243. The null hypothesis that the means were 
egual was not rejected.
The results of this t-test did not appear to confirm 
the hypothesis that firm size is related to choice of the 
immediate recognition method. Neither PLANSIZE nor ASSET 
was significant to the choice of transition method. This 
result indicates that firm size, whether measured by the 
relative size of the postretirement benefit plan or the 
total assets of the firm, had no influence on management's 
decision as to the transition method used.
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F i n  Maturity
The relationship of the maturity of the workforce of a 
firm to the choice of transition method is the subject of 
Hypothesis Six. A ratio of the number of retirees to 
number of employees was used to measure workforce maturity 
for each sample firm (RETEMP). The mean ratio was .315 
(see Table 4.3), which signified that there were more 
employees than retirees. For the IR firms this ratio was 
.318. The mean for the DR group was .308. which seemed to 
indicate a close match between levels for each group. The 
range for the sample was from a ratio of 0 to a maximum of 
12.534.
Since an F-test for equal variances gave a p-value of 
.0001, indicating that the null hypothesis of equal 
variances could be rejected, an approximate t-test was used 
to test whether the means of the two independent groups 
were equal. The t-test yielded a t-statistic of -.0783 
with a p-value of .9377 (see Table 4.4) which suggested 
that the means of the two groups are not significantly 
different. Thus, Hypothesis Six was not confirmed and the 
assumption that maturity was significant to the transition 
method choice is not supported. This result indicates that 
even though Espahbodi, Strock and Tehranian (1991) showed 
that RETEMP was significant to investors in relation to
Ill
SFAS 106, this ratio was not significant to managers in the 
adoption decision.
Industry Classification
Fifty-six firms (28.6 percent) were in the regulated 
category and 140 (71.4 percent) were non-regulated.
Sixteen (11.6 percent) of the IR firms were in regulated 
industries while 122 (88.4 percent) were not. Forty firms 
(69 percent) of the DR group were regulated and 18 (31 
percent) were members of non-regulated industries. A chi- 
square test yielded a Pearson chi-square statistic of 
65.862 with a p-value of .000 (see Table 4.4) indicating 
that there was an association between regulation of 
industries and transition method choice.
Since there were two predominant industries in the 
regulated group, banking/financial (SIC=between 6000 and 
6999) and utilities/transportation (SIC=between 4000 and 
4999). Chi-square tests were performed with each SIC group 
representing the regulated variable alone. When the 
banking group was excluded from the regulated subdivision, 
the chi-square statistic was 49.393 with a p-value of .000. 
When the 6000 level SIC firms were used as the regulated 
firms, with utilities excluded, the chi-square statistic 
was 9.451 with a p-value of .002. Both industry groupings 
appear to be significant to the transition method choice 
decision, individually and combined, consistent with the
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expectations of Hypothesis Six. Thus, univariate analysis 
suggests that membership in a regulated industry plays a 
role in the adoption decision. This result supports 
previous research showing that regulated industries want to 
delay recognition (Kelly 1983; Bowen, Lacey and Noreen 
1981; Mittelstaedt, Nichols and Reiger 1994).
Bonus Plsns
Eleven (5.6 percent) of the 196 sample firms did not 
report any information indicating the existence of 
incentive based bonus plans (BONUS). One hundred eighty- 
five (94.4 percent) did report the existence of a bonus 
plan. Of the firms that had plans 134 (97.1 percent) of 
the IR groups had plans as did 51 (87.9 percent) of the DR 
group (see Table 4.2). A chi-square test1' resulted in a 
Pearson chi-square statistic of 6.483 with a p-value of 
.011 (see Table 4-7) which indicated that there was an 
association between the existence of a bonus plan and 
transition method choice. The results of this test (which 
may be problematic, as a result of the low number of firms 
without bonus plans) indicate that Hypothesis One is 
supported, with firms having plans tending to recognize 
immediately. These univariate results are compared to
u There were only four observations for firms 
choosing immediate recognition with no bonus plan. Due to 
a count of less than five, the Chi-Square test, may not 
yield completely valid results.
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multivariate analysis in order to draw final conclusions 
concerning the significance of the bonus plan to the 
adoption decision.
Early Adoption
Analysis of the choice to adopt SFAS 106 (ADOPT) prior 
to the required adoption date revealed that of the 196 
sample firms, 100 (51 percent) adopted SFAS 106 early, 
while 96 (49 percent) chose to wait until the required 
time. Of the IR firms, 93 (67.4 percent) adopted early and 
45 (32.6 percent) adopted timely. Seven (12 percent) of 
the DR firms adopted early and 51 (88 percent) adopted 
timely (see Table 4-3). A chi-square analysis indicated a 
Pearson chi-square statistic of 50.014 and a p-value of 
.000 (see Table 4-7), which indicated that there was a 
significant association between early adoption and 
transition method choice, supporting Hypothesis Four that 
early adopting firms choose to recognize the transition 
obligation immediately. This result seems to indicate that 
firms wish to write off the transition obligation and to do 
it early while those that plan to amortize choose to delay 
as long as possible.
Concurrent Adoption of SFAS 109
One hundred forty firms (71.4 percent) of the sample 
firms adopted SFAS 109 in the same accounting period as 
SFAS 106, fifty-six (28.6 percent) did not. Of the IR
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firms, 102 (73.9 percent) adopted concurrently and 36 (26.1 
percent) did not. Thirty-eight (65.5 percent) of the DR
firms adopted at the same time, while 20 (34.5 percent) did
not (see Table 4-3). A chi-square analysis yielded a 
Pearson chi-square statistic of 1.410 with a p-value of
.235 (see Table 4-4), which indicated that the null
hypothesis of no association between the concurrent 
adoption and transition method choice could not be 
rejected. This did not appear to support Hypothesis Seven, 
that firms adopting SFAS 109 at the same time as SFAS 106 
will take the benefit of the tax-asset and recognize the 
transition obligation immediately.
Plan Amendments
Press releases, annual reports, and proxy statements 
were examined for years 1990 to 1994. This was to allow at 
least a two-year window around a firm's adoption of SFAS 
106. Postretirement plan amendments (AMEND) were announced 
within this time frame by 55 (28.1 percent) of the sample 
firms. (Types of amendments announced are listed in 
Appendix B.) One hundred forty-one firms (71.9 percent) 
did not report any plan amendments. Of those in the IR 
group, 41 (29.7 percent) reported amendments and 97 (70.3 
percent) did not report any amendments. Of the DR group,
14 (24.1 percent) reported amendments and 44 (75.9 percent) 
did not report amendments (see Table 4-2).
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A chi-square analysis resulted in a Pearson chi-square 
statistic of .628 with a p-value of .428 (see Table 4-4) 
which indicated that the null hypothesis of no association 
between plan amendments and transition method choice could 
not be rejected. This appears to discredit the assumptions 
that managers would use the opportunity provided by 
adoption of SFAS 106 to cut plan benefits and costs, while 
absorbing the transition obligation. Hypothesis Eight is 
not supported by these results.
Discussion
Table 4.8 provides the results of hypothesis testing 
using univariate analysis. Results of the t-tests of 
differences in means of variables and the chi-square tests 
of association indicated that three of the nine variables 
had statistically significant relationships: BONUS, Sic,
ADOPT. Univariate analysis failed to reject the null 
hypothesis of no significant relationship for LEV, 109, 
AMEND, PLANSIZE, SIZE and RETEMP. These results indicated 
that there may be support for hypotheses one (bonus), four 
(early adoption), and five (industry). (See Table 4-8.)
This initial analysis provided support for the 
traditional political cost hypotheses (with early adoption 
and industry representing high political cost situations), 
(Hypotheses four, and five), but failed to support the debt 
hypothesis (Hypothesis two) and the political cost
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hypothesis, as proxied by size (Hypothesis three). 
Hypothesis one, the existence of a bonus plan, appears to 
be supported, but some problems may underlie the chi-square 
analysis.
Results of univariate analysis did not support any of 
the three hypotheses that were specific to the adoption of 
SFAS 106 (Hypotheses Six - regarding work force maturity, 
Seven - concurrent SFAS 109 adoption, and Eight - 
announced plan amendments). Thus the conclusions drawn at 
this point indicate that the presence of more retirees than 
current employees is not important to the transition method 
choice decision, neither is the adoption of SFAS 109 nor 
anticipated plan amendments. The univariate test results 
indicated that the answer to the primary research question 
"Is there a significant relationship between plan 
amendments and the transition method choice?" is no.
Logistic Regression Models 
Two logistic regression models were used to evaluate 
the relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables. The difference between the two models was the 
different size proxies. One model was tested using 
PLANSIZE, a ratio of the transition
obiigation/stockholder's equity, and the other used ASSET,
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Table 4.8 
Results of Univariate Analysis
Hypothesis Prediction Results
8
The existence of an income- 
based bonus-plan is related 
to transition method choice.
High leverage is related to 
choice of the delayed 
recognition method.
Large firm or plan size is 
related to the choice of 
the immediate recognition 
method.
Early adoption is related to 
the choice of the immediate 
recognition method.
Regulation of industry is 
related to the choice of the 
immediate recognition method.
Maturity of a firm's work 
force is related to the 
transition method choice.
Concurrent adoption 109 is 
related to the choice of 
the immediate recognition 
method
Adoption of post-retirement 
benefit plan amendments is 










*Less than five observations in on grouping may yield 
questionable statistical results.
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the log of total assets. (Each of these measures of 
relative size of the firm captured a different aspect of 
political cost. One gave the size as it relates to 
postretirement benefits and the other gave a more 
traditional measure of firm size. In research in the 
specific area of postretirement benefits, use of both 
variables in the analysis may have yielded a more complete 
picture.)
After these models were tested, the data was analyzed 
for potential influential observations. Eleven potential 
outliers were identified. These outliers were then 
analyzed and the models were retested. The following 
sections present the results of the models, the 
accompanying diagnostic evaluations and outlier analysis. 
Results of logistic regression models
Two logistic regression models were first used to 
assess the relationship between the choice of disclosure 
method for the transition obligation and the independent 
variables. Each model contained eight independent 
variables. The first model contained the variable PLANSIZE 
(transition obligation/stockholder's equity) as the size 
proxy and the second contained ASSET (log of total assets) 
as the size proxy. The regression results are shown in 
Tables 4.9 and 4.10.
119
PLANSIZE Modal
The chi-square test for overall significance of this 
model yielded a value of 100.158 (p=.0001), indicating that 
the model fit was statistically significant. The pseudo R 
value was .5656, indicating the model has a moderate 
predictive ability. Three variables were identified as 
significant at the .05 level: ADOPT, 109, and SIC. Three
variables had parameters with signs that were opposite to 
the preliminary expectations. PLANSIZE, AMEND and SIC were 
each expected to have positive signs. However, of these 
three, only SIC was significant.
These results indicated that there was a significant 
relationship between the transition method choice and firms 
adopting SFAS 106 early, those concurrently adopting SFAS 
109 and membership in regulated and non-regulated 
industries. Hypothesis Four was confirmed as the variable 
ADOPT was significant and in the expected direction, 
showing a direct association between the decision to adopt 
SFAS 106 early and the choice of immediately recognizing 
the transition obligation. Hypothesis Seven was also 
confirmed indicating that firms that chose to adopt SFAS 
109 in the same year as SFAS 106 also used the immediate 
recognition method.
Hypothesis Five was not confirmed as the firms in 
regulated industries did not choose the immediate
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Table 4.9








BONUS undef ined l. 1093 1.3460 
(.2460)
LEV - -0.0386 . 3547 
(.5515)
PLANSIZE + -0.0449 . 7946 
(.3727)
ADOPT + 2 .4882 22.0270 
(.0001)*
SIC + -2.6161 32.0714 
(.0001)*
RETEMP undefined -0.2229 1.5457 
(.2138)
109 + 1.1457 5.2888 
(.0215)*
AMEND + -0.1897 . 1443 
( .7040)
* Significant at alpha<.05
-2 LOG L (Chi-Square = 100.158, p-value =.0001, DF=8) 
Pseudo-R = . 56898
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Table 4.10








BONUS undefined 0.8886 0.7924 
( . 3734)
LEV - -0.0446 0. 5270 
( .4679)
ASSET + 0. 1720 1.7637 
(.1842)
ADOPT + 2.5312 22.2626 
(.0001)*
SIC + -2.8996 29.6537 
(.0001)*
RETEMP undefined -0.2513 1. 7747 
(.1828)
109 + 1.2721 6.2202 
(.0126)*
AMEND + -0.2383 0.2221 
(.6374)
Significant at alphac.05
-2 LOG L (Chi-Square = 101.159, p = .0001, DF = 8)
Pseudo R = .57332
122
recognition method as predicted. The variable SIC was 
significant, but analysis revealed that firms in regulated 
industries tended to use the amortization method, while 
those in non-regulated industry were more likely to choose 
immediate recognition. In retrospect, this result is not 
surprising, since many regulatory bodies have indicated a 
willingness to allow various cost reducing measures and 
regulated industries may be planning to take advantage of 
these instead of taking a large loss immediately.
Analysis of this model confirmed one of the 
postretirement benefit-specific hypotheses {concurrent 109 
adoption) and two political cost hypotheses (early adoption 
and industry). The other hypotheses of interest in the PRB 
issue (firm maturity and amendments) were not confirmed in 
this model, nor were the traditional bonus, debt or size 
hypotheses.
ASSET Model
The size variable, PLANSIZE, used in the last model 
was replaced with ASSET, the log of total assets. This 
model also was shown to have a significant fit, with a chi- 
square of 101.159 (p=.0001). The logistic regression 
resulted in the three variables, ADOPT, 109 and SIC showing 
statistically significant parameters. These were the same 
results as in the previous model.
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All signs were the same except the parameter sign for 
ASSET, the size proxy. In this model the sign was positive 
which, if significant, would indicate a positive 
relationship between the amount of a firm's assets and the 
choice of the immediate recognition method. However, ASSET 
did not have significant results in the logistic 
regression. Since neither of the proxies for size were 
significant in the regressions, this change of sign 
presented an interesting, but not significant issue.
In this model, as in the previous one, only Hypotheses 
Four and Seven were supported. Early adoption and 
concurrent adoption of SFAS 109 were significant to the 
choice of transition method. The industry variable was 
significant, which meant that a firm's status as regulated 
or non-regulated was important to the transition method 
choice decision, but not in the expected direction.
Table 4.11 displays the results of the multivariate 
analysis using the two models, with PLANSIZE and ASSET.
Both models yielded similar results. Hypotheses Four, 
and Seven were confirmed. The industry regulation variable 
was significant, but as the sign was opposite from the
A model testing both variables simultaneously 
provided results similar to models using each individually. 
The same three variables (ADOPT, 109, and SIC) were 
significant and signs were the same on all variables.
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predicted sign, therefore Hypothesis Five was not 
confirmed.
One of the PRB hypotheses introduced in this research 
project, Hypothesis Seven, testing whether concurrent 
adoption of SFAS 109, was influential in the transition 
method choice. The others, testing whether firm maturity 
and plan amendments were related to transition 
Method choice, were not found to be significant in the 
multivariate regression models. The absence of firm 
maturity as a significant variable, is interesting in light 
of the findings of Espahbodi, Strock and Tehranian (1991) 
which indicated that the ratio of retirees to employees was 
significant to investors in relation to postretirement 
benefits. The findings relating to plan amendments show 
that there is no verification (through 1994) to the fears 
that managers would use the adoption of SFAS 106 to justify 
plan amendments. This finding provides new information to 
the research on SFAS 106 since the question had not been 
previously tested. The traditional bonus, debt and size 
hypotheses were also not found to be significant in these 
mode1s .
Comparison of Univariata and Multivariate Results
Results of hypothesis testing using both univariate 
and multivariate analysis are presented in Table 4.12.
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Table 4.11 
Results of Multivariate Analysis
Hypothesis Prediction Results
The existence of an income- 
based bonus-plan is related 
to transition method choice.
Not confirmed
High leverage is related to 
choice of the delayed 
recognition method.
Not confirmed
Large firm size is related to 
the choice of the immediate 
recognition method.
Not confirmed
Early adoption is related to 
the choice of the immediate 
recognition method.
Confirmed
Regulation of industry is 




sign is wrong 
direction)
Maturity of a firm's work 
force is related to the 
transition method choice.
Not confirmed
Concurrent adoption 109 is 
related to the choice of 
the immediate recognition 
method
Conf irmed
Adoption of post-retirement 
benefit plan amendments is 




The significance of the bonus plan variable was shown in 
univariate testing (with questionable Chi-square results), 
but the Hypothesis One was not confirmed in the logistic 
regression. Since the univariate tests were not as 
reliable as the multivariate regression, the conclusion 
about the bonus plan variable is made based on the 
regression results. These indicated that the bonus theory, 
which was upheld by previous researchers (Healy 1985, Scot 
1991) did not hold true in this research, possibly as a 
result of the income decreasing combined with "big bath" 
effects.
The relationship between early adoption of SFAS 106 
and choice of the immediate recognition method was 
significant in both tests and Hypothesis Four was 
confirmed. Early adoption had previously been tested by 
many researchers including Amir and Livnat 1992; Gujarathi 
and Hoskin 1992; Leauby, Ugras and Welch 1993b; and Amir 
and Ziv 1994. The results of this research confirm what 
had been previously reported. This is not surprising as 
the political cost theory predicts such results.
The industry membership was significant in both tests, 
but the direction, as shown in the logistic regression was 
opposite to expectations, so Hypothesis Five was not 
confirmed. However, this research clearly showed that the 
regulatory status of a firm plays an important role in
Table 4.12 
Results of Hypothesis Testing







".'he existence of an income- Confirmed hot confirmed
Leased bonus-plan is related 
to transition method choice.
High leverage is related to 
choice of the delayed 
i ecu;] n 11 1 on method .
Hot confirmed Hot conf irmed
.'urge firm si^e is related to 
t he choice of the immediate
recognition method.
Not c o n f 1rmed Not confirmed 
Not confirmed
burly adnpLion is related to confirmed Confirmed
the choice of the immediate 
recoijn i t i on me thod ,
Population of industry is 





Not Conf i rmed
(Significant, but
sign in opposite direction)
Maturity of a firm's work Not confirmed Not confirmed
force is related to the 
transition method choice.
Concurrent adoption 109 is Not confirmed Confirmed
related to the choice of 
the 1mmed i ate rocogn i t i on 
met hod
Adoption of post-ret 1rement Hot confirmed Hot confirmed
belief it plan amendments is 
related tn the choice of the 
immediate recognition method.
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transition method choice in the issue of postretirement 
benefit plans, which is another support for the political 
cost theory. Other traditional variables; leverage, size 
{both plan and firm), were not significant in either 
analysis. This indicates that the traditional debt and 
size hypotheses were not relevant to the transition method 
choice.
Concurrent adoption of SFAS 109 was not shown to be 
significant in Chi-Square testing, but was a significant 
variable in the logistic regression. Thus, Hypothesis 
Seven was confirmed in the multivariate analysis indicating 
that the concurrent adoption did have a relationship with 
transition method choice. This was the only one of the PRB 
specific variables proposed that was found to be 
significant. However, the findings concerning the other 
two variables (AMEND and RETEMP) provided additional 
information. Firm maturity was not found to be 
significant, which contradicted previous research.
Amending of postretirement plans was not found to be 
significant to manager's choice, contrary to public 
expectations, thus answering the primary research question: 




A classification table of observed and predicted 
values of the transition method (TMETH) was constructed for 
each logistic regression model (Table 4.13). The PLANSIZE 
model correctly predicted the chosen method 86.2 percent 
(169/196) of the sample firms. A false positive rate of 
17.0 percent (8/47) and a false negative rate of 12.8 
percent (19/149) were observed. The model's sensitivity 
measure, number of firms choosing immediate recognition as 
predicted, was 94.2 percent (130/138) and the specificity 
measure, number of firms choosing to amortize as 
predicted, was 67.2 percent (39/58).
The SIZE model correctly predicted the chosen method 
for 85.7 percent (168/196) of the sample firms. A false 
positive rate of 18.8 percent (9/48) and a false negative 
rate of 12.8 percent (19/148) were observed. The model's 
sensitivity measuring number of firms choosing immediate 
recognition that were predicted to do so, was 93.5 percent 
(129/138). The model's specificity, number of firms 










Col. Percent 0 1
0 39 19
19 .90 9 . 69
67 . 24 32 .76
81.25 12 . 84
1 8 130
4 . 08 66. 33
5.80 94 .20
17.02 87 .25






Col. Percent 0 1
0 39 19
19. 90 9. 69
67 . 24 32.76
81.25 12 . 84
1 9 129
4.59 65.82
6.52 93 . 48
18.75 87 . 16
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The proportional chance criterion, used to determine 
the predictive accuracy that would exist due to pure 
chance, was calculated:
CtI t = P + (1-P)
where CF, = proportional chance criteria
p = proportion of firms choosing immediate 
recognition 
1-p = proportion of firms choosing delayed 
recognition
This calculated criteria for the sample of 196 firms was 
.583 or 58.3 percent. The predicted accuracies of 86.2 and 
85.7 percent were well above the recommended 25 percent 
margin (1.25 x 58.3 = 72.9 percent), indicating that the 




The existence of high correlations between the 
independent variables, multicollinearity, may indicate 
problems in the evaluation of the effect of an independent 
variable upon the dependent variable. To determine if 
multicollinearity existed in the data collected, a 
correlation matrix using Pearson correlation coefficients 
was constructed (Table 4.14). The null hypothesis, that 
the correlation between any two variables is zero, was 
tested using all nine of the variables (both size variables 
included).
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Five relationships displayed significant correlation 
coefficients: ASSET and AMEND (.19723), SIC and ASSET
(.29434), SIC and BONUS (-.14020), SIC and ADOPT 
(-.39698), and PLANSIZE and BONUS (-.15717). From these 
results, it appears that classification of industry 
(regulated vs. nonregulated) appeared to be positively 
correlated to firm size, and negatively correlated to 
existence of a bonus plan and early adoption of SFAS 106. 
This industry variable was found to be significant, in the 
hypothesis testing, to transition method choice, however, 
with the presence of these correlations, the possibility 
exists that other information may be impounded in this 
result.
The existence of a bonus plan was found to be 
significant in univariate testing and correlation results 
indicate a relationship between BONUS and industry 
membership, as well as the relative size of the firm, 
measured by the transition obligation/stockholder's equity. 
This may indicate that firms giving bonuses tend to be 
those with smaller postretirement benefit plans. There is 
also correlation between the log of total assets and 
announced plan amendments. This would possibly tend to 
imply that large firms took advantage of the opportunity to 
make amendments to their postretirement benefit plans.
Table 4.14
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
P-values
TMETH BONUS EARLY LEV 109 AMEND PLANSIZE ASSET SIC
BONUS .1B 18 7
.0107
EARLY . SOS 15 .115B4
.0001 .1059
LEV .004 10 -.04941 .09280
.9546 .4916 .1958
109 .08481 -.00701 -.05487 -.09876
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While there are five correlation problems (all with p- 
values < .05) the multicollinearity is not considered to be 
a serious problem until the correlation coefficient is 
greater than .8 or .9 (Judge et al 1988).
Further examination for potential multicollinearity 
problems was conducted by performing structural analyses of 
the relationships between variables using the eigenvalues 
of the matrix of correlation coefficients, developed from 
an OLS regression'. Analysis of eigenvalues can provide an 
indication of the severity of the multicollinearity 
problem, with values close to zero indicating higher 
degrees of multicollinearity (Judge et al 1988). Related 
condition indices above thirty usually indicate a high 
degree of multicollinearity (Judge et al 1988).
Eigenvalues ranged from .51069 to 1.56965, while 
condition indices ranged from l.0 to 1.75316. The lowest 
eigenvalue shown was .51069 for condition factor eight 
which also had the highest condition index. Table 4.15 
presents the results of these analyses, which indicated 
that there were no multicollinearity problems within this 
set of variables.
Results are reported for the PLANSIZE model.
Results were very close in both models. R was .45 in both 
and adjusted R was .43. Eigenvalues and Condition Indices 




Number Eigenvalue Condition Index
1 1.56965 1.00000








Analysis was conducted to determine if any 
observations were separated from the remainder of the data 
or exerted an extreme amount of influence over the model or 
any of the variables. Results of statistical analysis from 
the logistic regression models were examined as the first 
step in identifying outlying firms. This was done by 
observation of influence table values and iplots provided 
in SAS analysis. Pearson residuals, Deviance residuals,
Hat Matrix, DfBeta values, C values, Cbar values, Dif.Dev., 
and Dif. Chi Square values were used to distinguish twenty- 
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Table 4.16). (Seven observations had only one outlying 
value, five had two outlying values, two observations had 
four outlying values, two had five, three observations 
had six, one had seven and one observation had eight 
outlying values.)
The firm characteristics of these twenty-one 
observations were then analyzed for extreme values of the 
nine variables ana their components. The results of this 
analysis in shown in Table 4.17. Of the 21 firms with 
outlying statistical values, eleven also had 
characteristic values in the extreme range for at least one 
of the nine variables of interest. The last step in 
identifying potential outliers was to examine all of the 
196 sample firms for extreme values of the nine variables. 
Comparison of these observations (statistical analysis and 
extreme value search) led to the list of thirteen firms, 
which had multiple indications in the outlier analysis 
process, to be examined as potentially influential 
observations (See Table 4.18).
First, each of these observations was deleted from the 
sample individually and results were analyzed. Then, 
beginning with Observation 195 (with eight statistical 
outlying indicators) combinations of observations were 
deleted, adding, one at a time based on the results of the 
individual analysis. Firms with negative Stockholder's
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Table 4.17
Statistical Outlier Firm Characteristics
Obs T M E T H LEV PL A N
S I Z E
A S S E T EMP RET
EMP
SE
25 1 . 02716 12.5344
92 1 36.4721
11 1 9 . 5 57 4
13 1 1 .0174 0
133 1 -3 -0243 -34.14
140 0 29 - 65"
164 0 12.7963
172 0 .03 17
173 0 15946 i
192 0 . .0038 4 .8756 1
195 0 0 1i
Equity (See Table 4.4) were also deleted as a group.
Results of this regression are given in Appendix B. Table 
4.19 displays the differences from the full model that were 
obtained when observations were deleted.
Three variables (ADOPT, 109, and SIC)were significant 
in the models using the full sample. Table 4-19 shows that 
the only change involving one of these is the result that 
occurs when observation 151 (Data General Corp.) is deleted 
in combination with one oi more of the other outlier 
variables. This firm had no observable outlying values of 
firm characteristics, but did show several outlying
140
Table 4.18
List of Outlying Firms
DBS NO NAME
140 Acme Electric Corp.
22 Bell Industries Inc.
151 Data General Corp.
164 Lear Seating Co.
92 Neiman-Marcus Group Inc.
172 Oregon Steel Mills Inc.
178 Scott Paper Co.
117 Sprint Corp.
195 Wheeling Pittsburgh CP
131 Union Planters Corp.
133 United Merchants and Mfrs
25 USX Corp Consolidated
192 Vishay Intertechnology
statistical values (AMEND DfBeta, Dif Dev, Dif ChiSq, 
Pearson Resid., Dev Resid., and ADOPT DfBeta) (See Table. 
4.16). When this observation was deleted alone there was 
no significant change, but when deleted in combination with 
others, 109 became significant at alpha = .10, instead of 
at alpha = .05. Variable 109 is a dummy variable 
indicating concurrent adoption of SFAS 109 with SFAS 106. 
Since no outlying values are possible for this variable, 
this observation could not have exerted extreme influence 
on the variable itself, so the effect must occur somewhere 
in the other variables in the model. From observational 
analysis, there does not appear to be a visible explanation
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for this change of significance level of this particular 
variable.
Several changes occurred among the previously non­
significant variables as shown in Table 4.19. When 
observation 133 was deleted, both alone and when deleted 
along with observation 195 (deleting other observations in 
addition did not change the effect), BONUS became 
significant at alpha = .10. BONUS also became significant 
at the .10 level when firms with negative Stockholder's 
Equity were deleted. Observation 133 represents United 
Merchants and Mfrs. and observation 195 is Wheeling 
Pittsburgh CP. Observation 133 had one of the negative 
values of Stockholders' Equity ehich also resulted in a 
negative value of LEV. Thsi observation did show an 
outlying value of the BONUS Df beta of .7970 (PLANSIZE 
model) and .8141 (ASSET model), indicating that there was 
influence exerted on the variable by this observation.
Observation 195 did not have any outlying values 
relating to BONUS, but did have extreme values of Pearson 
Residual, Dev. Resid, ADOPT Dfbeta, AMEND DfBeta, C Bar,
Dif Dev, and Dif Chi Square (7 outlying values).
Observation 133 appeared to be the more influential, but in 
combinations with other outliers the effect changed more 
often when 195 was also deleted. The effect of this result
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Table 4.19
Results of Outlier Analysis
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is to confirm the questionable result of the univariate 
analysis.
Another variable, RETEMP, became significant at the 
.10 level when observation 25 (USX Corp Consolidated) was 
deleted in combinations including observation 195 (Wheeling 
Pittsburgh CP). Deleting either of these observations alone 
caused no changes, but the two deleted together and 
combined with other outlying firms caused the change in 
significance of RETEMP. Observation 25 had the highest 
value of RETEMP, 12.534, indicating over twelve and one 
half retirees for every employee, while 195 had a RETEMP 
value of o. The RETEMP Dfbeta of observation 25 is also an 
extreme value, while observation 195 did not have an have 
an outlying value of Dfbeta. There were other observations 
in the sample with RETEMP values of 0, but the high values 
of the other outlier statistics for 195 indicates that 
there is some level of influence exerted.
This result is an important one to this research, 
since the full model did not indicate any significance for 
the RETEMP variable, in contradiction of previous research. 
When the outliers are deleted, RETEMP became significant at 
the .10 level. This result suggests that plans with a 
higher level of retirees to employees tended to delay 
amortization. This confirms Hypothesis Six at the alpha =
.10 level.
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The variable LEV changed signs from negative to 
positive when observation 164 (Lear Seating Co.) was 
deleted, both alone and in combination with other 
observations. The variable did not change in level of 
insignificance however. This observation had a high 
positive value of LEV, the debt ratio, but not the highest 
of the sample. (Observation 92, Neiman Marcus, had the 
highest, but no changes in results were observed when 
deleted from the sample.) The LEV Df beta was also high for 
the PLANSIZE model, but again, not the highest of all 
observations. Observation 164 also had high statistical 
values of BONUS Dfbeta, Intercept Dfbeta, C Bar, and Dif 
Dev. Even though, the deletion of this observation caused 
a change in the sign, indicating that the effect of high 
debt was positive (opposite to prediction), there was still 
a lack of significance of the variable.
AMEND also changed signs from negative to positive 
when outlying firms were deleted. Observation 195 
(Wheeling Pittsburgh CP), deleted alone, caused no change, 
but in combinations including 25 (USX Corp) and 151 (Data 
General Corp) the sign change was evidenced. AMEND, a 
dummy variable, had no extreme values, but Observations 195 
and 25 did have extreme values of RETEMP as well as several 
high values in outlier statistics. Observation 151 had 
high values of AMEND Dfbeta (See Table 4.16). The change
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of sign confirmed the predicted direction, suggesting that 
firms amending plans tended to amortize, however, since the 
result is not significant, no conclusions can be drawn.
When all five of the above listed observations were 
deleted, 151, 164, 133, 25, and 195, the results were as
discussed above, with one exception. Observation 133 
changed the significance level of the BONUS variable only 
when deleted alone and with 195. Since three other 
variables were deleted, BONUS was not statistically 
significant.
Discussion
Table 4.20 presents the results of all tests of the 
research hypotheses. All models tested were shown to be 
significantly significant at the .0001 level. Three 
variables were shown to be influential at .05 level for the 
full sample: ADOPT, 109 and SIC. ADOPT and 109 had signs
which were in conformance with expectations, thus 
supporting Hypotheses Four and Seven. When specific 
outliers were deleted 109 was no longer statistically 
significant .05 but was significant at .10.
SIC had an unexpected sign, which refuted Hypothesis 
Five, but the significance of the variable indicated that 
regulatory status of firm was important to the transition 
decision. Instead of choosing immediate recognition,
Table 4.20 
Results of Hypotheses Testing
Hyp Prediction Results (full sample) (Out 1 iers Deleted)
llnvar iate Hu 1t ivar iate Mu 11 ivar i ate
The existence of an income- 
based bonus-plan is related 
to transition method choice.
Conf i rmed * (lot confirmed Conf irmed*•
High leverage is related to 
choice of the delayed 
recognition method.
Not confirmed Not conf i rmed Not confirmed
Large firm site is related to 
the choice of the immediate 
recognition method.
(lot con f i rmed Not confirmed Not confirmed
Early adoption is related to 
the choice of the immediate 
recognition method.
Conf irmed• Confirmed* Conf irmed*
hegulation of industry is' 
related to the choice of the 
immediate recognition method.
Hot confirmed 
(Siq* , not as 
p r e d . )
Hot Confirmed 
(Siq. but 
sign in opp dir)
Not confirmed 
(Siq*, but sign 
in opp ,dir)
Maturity of a firm's work 
force is telated to the 
transition method choice.
(lot confirmed Not confirmed Conf i rmed* *
Concurrent adoption 109 is 
related to the choice of 
the immediate recognition 
method
(lot confirmed Conf irmed* Conf irmed* *
A d o p t i o n  of p o s t -r e 1 1 re me nt 
benef it  p l a n  a m e n d m e n t s  is 
relat ed  to the c h o i c e  of the 
i m m ediate r e c o g n i t i o n  me thod.
Not confirmed (lot con t irmed
s i q n 1 1 l e a n t  a t  . 0 5
Not conf irmed
** significant at .10
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regulated firms had a tendency to choose amortization.
This unexpected result could possibly be explained by the 
fact that many regulatory agencies were in the process of 
decisions to allow firms (especially utilities) to pass 
along costs or to adjust rates to accommodate the 
transition obligation.
Observation of the signs on all variables revealed 
some interesting and unexpected , but insignificant 
relationships. PLANSIZE and ASSET, the two size measures 
had opposite signs. PLANSIZE had a negative sign, which 
indicated that when the transition obligation/equity ratio 
was large, a firm chose to amortize. ASSET had a positive 
sign which denoted that a firm with a large amount of 
assets chose to recognize immediately.
LEV had the predicted negative sign, which indicated 
that a firm with a large debt/equity ratio would choose to 
amortize. When specific outliers were deleted, the sign 
changed to positive, which revealed that certain 
observations in the DR group had been exerting influence on 
this variable. The positive sign for the remaining model 
denoted that high debt ratios would cause a company to 
immediately recognize, an unpredicted, but not 
statistically significant, directional relationship.
AMEND also changed signs when certain observations 
were removed. In the full model AMEND had a negative sign
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which was opposite to the expectations that firms with plan 
amendments chose to immediately recognize. After the 
influential observations were deleted, the sign changed to 
positive confirming what had been expected, however, with 
insignificant results.
Two variables did not have hypothetically predicted 
signs, BONUS and RETEMP. The results of the regression 
indicated that the presence of an incentive based bonus 
plan had a positive relationship to the choice to 
immediately recognize. The ratio of retiree/employees had 
an inverse relationship to the decision to immediately 
recognize the transition obligation. Neither of these 
variables was significant for the regressions using the 
full sample, but when specific outliers were removed both 
became significant at .10 level.
These results confirm that the existence of income- 
based bonus plans and the ratio of retirees to employees 
were significant to the transition method choice. The 
sign for BONUS was positive indicating that firms with 
plans chose to recognize immediately, possibly supporting 
the "big bath" theory. The sign for RETEMP was negative 
which meant that firms with a high ratio of retirees to 
employees chose to amortize. This suggests that those 
firms which have high costs due to large number of
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retirees, as opposed to future costs for current employees, 
sought to delay recognition.
In the final analysis, after related outliers had been 
deleted, five variables were significant. Two (ADOPT, SIC) 
at the .05 level and three (BONUS, RETEMP, and 109) at the 
.10 level. Four hypotheses were confirmed: One, Four, Six, 
and Seven (See Table 4.20). Hypothesis Five was not 
confirmed as the sign was in the wrong direction.
The "big bath" theory was supported at the .10 level, 
but the income-decreasing effect of SFAS 106 did not 
necessarily support the traditional bonus theory. The debt 
theory was not supported, nor was the size aspect of the 
political cost theory. However, other political cost 
proxies, industry regulation and early adoption were 
confirmed as significant in the transition method choice 
decision.
Two of the PRB specific hypotheses were confirmed: Six 
and Seven. The variables RETEMP and 109 were significant 
at the .10 level. 109 was significant at .05 using the 
full sample, before outliers were deleted. The variable 
AMEND, representing plan amendments was not significant. 
With these results, this research is able to introduce new 
data confirming the importance of some information to a 
manager's transition method choice. The fear that managers
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would use the choice to justify plan amendments is not 
confirmed in this study.
Summary
Chapter four contained the results of the research 
study. The first section described the sample selection 
process. A final sample of 196 firms was collected, of 
which 58 chose to delay recognition of the transition 
obligation by amortizing over a future period and 138 chose 
to immediately recognize the obligation in the year of 
adoption. The next section presented the results of 
univariate analysis of the independent variables. Three 
variables were found to be significant: BONUS, SIC, and 
ADOPT (see Table 4.8). Hypothesis One, indicating a 
relationship between the existence of a bonus plan and 
transition method choice; Hypothesis Four, indicating a 
relationship between early adoption and transition method 
choice and Hypothesis Five, indicating a relationship 
between regulatory status of industry and transition method 
choice were supported.
The third section contained the results of the 
logistic regression models. Three variables were found to 
be significant for the full sample: SIC, ADOPT and 109
(see Table 4.15). The model yielded support for the 
Hypotheses Four, a relationship between early adoption and 
transition method choice and Seven, indicating a
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relationship between concurrent adoption of SFAS 109 and 
transition method choice. The industry grouping was found 
to be significant, but as the sign was opposite to 
expectations, a relationship was indicated, but not in the 
predicted direction. The models were found to be 
significant at the .0001 level and there was not a problem 
with multicollinearity. The fourth section examined the 
predictive ability of the model, which was greater than 
could be achieved by chance. When outliers were deleted, 
one variable, 109, became significant at .10 instead of 
.05. Two variables, BONUS and RETEMP, which were not 
significant with the full sample, became significant at 
. 10 .
This research tested the effect of three PRB related 
variables on managers' transition method choice. RETEMP 
and 109 were shown to be significant at alpha = .10 when 
influential observations were deleted. The variable AMEND 
was not significant to the model. Firms did not choose 
immediate recognition and announce amendments to their 
postretirement plans within a two year time period. When 
outliers were deleted, the sign was positive, but the 
variable was still not significant. The answer to the 
primary research question "Is there a significant 
relationship between plan amendments and the transition 
method choice?" was found to be "no".
CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion
This chapter contains the summary and conclusions of 
this research study. The first section is an overview of 
the study. The second section contains the expected 
findings, followed by the reported results of the study in 
the third section. The fourth section includes the 
conclusions and the fifth section is a discussion of the 
limitations of the study. The last section examines some 
possible areas to expand this research.
Overview
SFAS 106 was issued in 1990 and required to be adopted 
by most US firms in the fiscal year beginning after 1992. 
Firms had a choice of two methods of recognizing the 
transition obligation. The obligation was recognized 
immediately in its entirety as a cumulative effect of an 
accounting change in the year of adoption or was amortized 
over a future period, not to exceed 20 years. The purpose 
of this study was to examine the factors which motivated 
managers' choices of transition method. The primary 
research question was "Is there a significant relationship 




Specifically, firm specific characteristics were 
examined to determine if there was a significant 
relationship to the transition method decision. Several 
variables were used which had previously been shown to be 
significant in management choice studies, as well as some 
variables specific to the question of postretirement 
benefits. Eight hypotheses were presented to test each of 
the firm specific characteristics. The primary question of
interest in this study relating to the adoption of SFAS 106
was to determine if there was a significant relationship 
between the transition method choice and decisions to amend 
postretirement benefit plans.
A sample of 196 firms was selected from COMPUSTAT and
NAARS data sources. Eight hypotheses were tested using two
logistic models.
H,: The presence of an income-based bonus plan
is significant to the choice of transition method
in adopting SFAS 106. (BONUS)
H : Firms with high leverage will choose the 
delayed recognition method of adopting SFAS 106.
(LEV)
H,: Large firms will choose to immediately
recognize the OPEB transition obligation.
(PLANSIZE and ASSET)
H4: Firms which adopt SFAS 106 early will choose
to immediately recognize the OPEB transition 
obligation. (ADOPT)
154
H : Firms in regulated or politically sensitive 
industries will choose to immediately recognize 
the OPEB transition method in adopting SFAS 106. 
(SIC)
H, : Work force maturity will be a significant
factor in a manager's choice of transition method 
in the adoption of SFAS 106. (RETEMP)
H.: Firms adopting SFAS 109 in the same year as 
SFAS 106 will use the immediate recognition 
method in adopting SFAS 106. (109)
Hlt: Firms which have amended their nonpension
postretirement benefit plan will use the 
immediate recognition method of adopting SFAS 
106. (AMEND)
Each hypothesis was represented by one variable (as shown 
in parentheses above) except for Hypothesis Three which was 
tested using two variables in separate regressions. 
Statistical analysis was conducted to determine the 
statistical significance of each variable and the 
predictive ability of the model.
Expected Findings 
As discussed in Chapter Two, five of the variables 
included in this research had previously been shown to be 
significant in management choice studies. The existence of 
bonus plans had been shown to be significant to managers as 
they seek to maximize their own wealth in their decision 
making. Incentive based bonus plans were expected to have 
a significant effect on the transition method choice, but
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the direction of this effect was not determined, thus a 
two-tailed hypothesis was presented.
Size was represented by two different variables 1) a 
ratio of the transition obligation to stockholder's equity 
and 2) log of total assets. Firms with greater size were 
expected to select immediate recognition since they were 
more likely to be able to afford the large write-off while 
also sending a positive signal to the market. The presence 
of debt had also been shown to be a significant factor in 
management choice decisions. A high debt ratio, non- 
current liabilities to stockholder's equity was expected to 
influence a firm to amortize the transition obligation.
Early adoption had been shown to have a significant 
relationship to manager's choices in adopting new 
standards. In this case, it was expected that firms 
adopting early would choose to immediately recognize the 
transition obligation. Industry membership had also played 
an important role in adoption of new standards. Firms in 
regulated industries were expected to immediately recognize 
the transition obligation.
Issue specific variables, AMEND, 109 and RETEMP were 
placed in this model to extend the research into areas 
which had not been previously examined. Evidence of plan 
amendments was expected to coincide with immediate 
recognition of the transition obligation. Concurrent
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recognition of SFAS 109 also was expected to have a 
positive relationship, since SFAS 109 allowed a large tax 
benefit which could offset the high cost of SFAS 106 
adoption. The ratio of retirees to employees was expected 
to be significant, but the direction of the relationship 
was undetermined prior to testing the model.
Result*
Univariate analysis of the independent variables 
indicated that three of the nine variables, BONUS, SIC, and 
ADOPT, were able to differentiate between transition method 
(IR and DR) groups. The null hypothesis of no difference 
between groups was not rejected for ASSET, LEV, 109, AMEND, 
PLANSIZE and RETEMP. These univariate and frequency tests 
revealed initial support for the bonus, early adoption, and 
industry hypotheses.
Two logistic models were tested for explanatory value. 
Examination of the correlation tables using all variables 
revealed that there was a possibility that 
multicollinearity might be present. However, further 
analysis of eigenvalues and condition indices did not 
indicate a problem in this area. Goodness of fit tests 
indicated that both models were statistically significant.
Regression results, using the full sample of 196 
firms, yielded three significant variables in both models: 
ADOPT, 109 and SIC. The signs for ADOPT and 109 were in
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conformance with the expectations and thus supported 
hypotheses four and seven. While industry membership was 
significant to the model, the sign was opposite to the 
expectations. Signs of PLANSIZE and AMEND were opposite to 
the expected signs, but these variables were not 
significant. Using the alternate size proxy, ASSET yielded 
a positive sign, which had been predicted, but the variable 
was not significant. The two variables whose signs had not 
been predicted, BONUS (positive) and RETEMP (negative) were 
also not significant to the model. Both models were shown 
to have significant predictive value.
Outliers were eliminated and the models re-evaluated. 
The variable 109 was significant at .10 level in this 
reduced sample, but ADOPT and SIC were still shown to have 
statistical significance at the .05 level. Two other 
variables, BONUS and RETEMP became significant at the .10 
level when specific observations were deleted. Two sign 
changes were observed: LEV and AMEND both changed to a
positive sign when certain outliers were deleted.
Conclusions
Hypotheses One, Four, Six, Seven and Eight were 
confirmed in this study. The choice to adopt early was 
seen as a political cost issue. Firms adopting standards 
early often attempted to send a signal of fiscal health to
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the market. This result supported results of previous 
research on early adoption and SFAS 106.
Adoption of SFAS 109 in the same period as SFAS 106 
was expected, as firms would seek to use the tax benefit 
available in adopting SFAS 109 to offset the large cost of 
adopting SFAS 106. This relationship had not been 
extensively examined in management choice literature since 
it is specific to this issue. The results confirmed that a 
positive relationship existed between the two adoptions.
The existence of a bonus plan was significant when 
related outliers were excluded. This did not support the 
traditional bonus plan theory that managers who have 
incentive based bonus plans will seek to maximize income, 
but did possibly lend credence to the "big bath" theory.
The ratio of retirees to employees was also shown to be 
significant. This indicated that firms with higher number 
of retirees tended to delay recognition, possibly as a 
result of higher costs compared to those with more current 
employees.
Industry membership was also significant to the 
management transition method decision, but the direction 
was opposite of the expected direction. Regulated firms 
had been expected to use immediate recognition since they 
were assumed to be exposed to higher political costs. 
Theoretically, firms with high political costs seek to
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reduce income, thus recognizing the transition obligation 
immediately would yield the greater income reduction. 
Examination of the footnotes of regulated firms in the 
sample revealed that many firms, especially utilities chose 
to amortize, possibly because the regulatory bodies were 
considering ways to pass on the costs to customers over 
time.
Lack of significant regression results for size 
variables and debt ratios were contrary to the findings of 
many previous researchers, as discussed in Chapter Two.
This result may have been due to the unique aspects of SFAS 
106, the income-decreasing effect and the magnitude of the 
transition obligation. The signs of these variables also 
did not confirm previous expectations. Only LEV and ASSET 
had signs as predicted. However, the sign for LEV changed 
when one influential observation was deleted.
Only one issue specific variable, AMEND, was not 
significant to the model, but evaluation of the sign of the 
parameter provided information relevant to the 
relationships. AMEND was expected to have a positive 
relationship to the choice to immediately recognize. This 
was not confirmed. Firms amending their postretirement 
plans did not indicate a preference for immediate 
recognition. This contradicted the fears and suggestions 
made by many FASB observers who felt that the large write-
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off afforded by SFAS 106 would be used by companies to 
reduce employee benefits.
This study provided several interesting pieces of 
information to add to the management choice literature.
The primary research issue, to determine if there was a 
relationship between transition method choice and plan 
amendments, was examined and no significant relationship 
was found. The relationships supported were those between 
the transition method choice and early adoption, industry 
regulation, concurrent adoption of SFAS 109, the existence 
of bonus plans and the ratio of retirees to employees.
Limitations
Several limitations common to management choice 
studies were present in this research. Proxies were chosen 
to represent factors such as debt covenants, size of firms, 
etc. There are many ratios and financial numbers which 
could be used to measure these factors. The proxies which 
were selected for this study were supported by previous 
research as discussed in Chapters Two and Three, however 
limitations due to the selection of the proxies may be 
present, as results confirmed a lack of significance of 
several variables in the model.
The use of a logistic model had many advantages, but 
there were also some issues that must be considered. Stone 
and Rasp (1991) found that sample sizes of 200 or more are
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necessary to ensure that nominal and empirical error rates 
will not be different. The sample size for this study was 
reduced to 196 firms. Aldrich and Nelson {1984) indicated 
that when bias exists due to a small sample size, the t- 
tests will have an anticonservatively biased result.
Sample selection, while done on a random basis, was 
limited to firms that were publicly traded and reported on 
COMPUSTAT. Firms that had incomplete data were also 
excluded from the sample. The results of this study, 
therefore, may not be generalizable to a greater population 
of firms.
Future Research
This study attempted to combine traditionally proven 
accounting measures with some new and issue specific 
variables to extend the previous accounting research.
There are other considerations which have not been included 
in this model. Issues such as income variation during the 
period of SFAS 106 adoption could have significant 
influence on the adoption decision. Also unique issues 
such as bankruptcy, initial public offerings and other firm 
specific information could be placed in the model to 
determine what relationships exist.
Sample selection could be improved with the addition 
of a broader spectrum of firms. This would improve the 
generalizabi1ity of the results. Also a larger sample size
162
would alleviate problems with the logistic model. The 
sample size could be greatly expanded if information was 
made more readily available. While much information is 
easily acquired on computer data bases, some key figures 
relating to employee status is available only in government 
documents or directly from company offices. A potential 
area of development for future researchers would be in 
improving the availability of information, possibly by 
expanding the current data banks or developing new ones.
This research project will continue to be developed 
and refined. More variables will be added to the model and 
different statistical analyses will be performed. Further 
details of variables such as: break-down of regulated 
industries, break-down of plan amendments, and bonus plan 
details will be considered. As new standards are released 
in the postretirement/ postemployment arena, this research 
can be applied and used to evaluate the adoption process.
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APPENDIX A 
Sample Companies bv Industry
Companies classified as non-reaulated industry
Company SIC
Amax Gold Inc 1041
Battle Mountain Gold Co 1041
Rio Algom Ltd 1094
USX Corp Consolidated 1311
Mitchel1 Energy and Dev 1311
Enron Corp 1321
Reading and Bates Corp 13 81
Sonat Offshore Drilling Inc 1381
Dravo Corp 14 00
Campbell Soup Co 203 2
Ralston Purina Group 2051
Tootsie Roll inds 2064
Anheuser-Busch Cos Inc 2082
Seagram Co Ltd 2085
American Brands Inc 2111
Culbro Corp 2121
United Merchant and Mfrs 2200
Georgia-Pacific Corp 2436
Interlake Corp 2452
Lear Seating Co 2531
Domtar Inc 2 621
Union Camp Corp 2621
Temple Inland Inc 2631
Federal Paper Board Co 2631
Bemis Co 2671
Nashua Corp 2672
James River Corp of Virginia 2676
Scott Paper Co 2676





Houghton Mifflin Co 2731










AL Laboratories, Inc 2834
Proctor and Gamble Co 2840
Helene Curtis Inds 2844
Sterling Chemicals Inc 2860
Arco Chemical Co 2869





Crown Central Petroleum 2911
Diamond Shamrock Inc 2911
Du Pont (El) du Nemours 2911
Mobil Corp 2911
Murphy Oil Corp 2911
Valero Energy Corp 2911
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co 3011
Tredegar Industries Inc 3081
O'Sullivan Corp 3089
Wolverine World Wide 3143
PPG Industries Inc 3211
Lone Star Industries 3241
Raytech Corp 3292
Oregon Steel Mills Inc 3312
Wheeling Pittsburgh CP 3312
National-Standard Co 3315
Carpenter Technology 3321
Aluminum Co of America 3334
Reynolds Metals 3334
Newmont Mining Corp 3339
RMI Titanium Co 3350
Alumax Inc 3365




Material Sciences Corp 3470






Clark Equipment Co 3531
Dover Corp 3534
Monarch Machine Tool Co 3541
Federa1-Mogul Corp 3562
Ingersoll-Rand Co 3562
Dressar Industries Inc 3563
Ceridian Corp 3571
Data General Corp 3571
Diebold Inc 3578
Smith Corona Corp 3579
Nortek Inc 3585





Texas Instruments Inc 3674
AMP Inc 3678
Charter Power Systems 3692
Arc International Corp 3679
United Industrial Corp 3699
Chrysler Corp 3711
Hastings Mfg Co 3714
Mark IV Industries Inc 3714
Schwitzer Inc 3714
Standard Products Co 3714
Boeing Co 3721
McDonnell Douglas Corp 3721





Martin Marietta Corp 3764
Litton Industries Inc 3812




Baxter International Inc 3841
Everest and Jennings 3842
Allergan Inc 3851




Genuine Parts Co 
Bell Industries Inc 
Barnes Group Inc 
AAR Group
Fleming Companies Inc 
Supervalu Inc 
Univar Corp
Neiman-Marcus Group Inc 
Teppco Partners 
Melville Corp 
Morrison Restaurants Inc 
Tiffany and Co 
Reynolds and Reynolds
Companies classified as regulated industry
Santa Fe Pacific Corp 
American President Cos LTD 
Kirby Corp 
Federal Express Corp 
AT&T Corp 
GTE Corp
Southern New England Telecomm 














United Cities Gas Co
Nicor Inc
Consolidated Edison of NY 
Delmarva Power and Light 













































Long island Lighting 4931
Montana Power Co 4931
Northern States Power (MN) 4931
Pacific Gas and Electric 4931
San Diego Gas and Electric 4931
Sierra Pacific Res 4931
Western Resources Inc 4931
Wisconsin Energy Corp 4931
California Water Service Co 4941
SJW Corp 4941
Southern California Water Co 4941
First Bank System Inc 6021
Hibernia Corp 6021
Chemical Financial Corp 6022
SPS Technologies Inc 6452
NBD Bancorp Inc 6712
PNC Bank Corp 6712
Union Planters Corp 6712
Zions Bancorporation 6712
Bankamerica Corp 6712
Central Fidelity Banks Inc 6712
Citizens Bancshares Inc 6712
Crestar Financial Corp 6712
Northern Trust Corp 6712
SFFED Corp 6712
Southtrust Corp 6712
Suntrust Banks Inc 6712
UJB Financial Corp 6712
Wells Fargo and Co 6712
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Appendix B 
Logistic Regression Results 







BONUS undef ined 1.9410 3.0992 
( . 0783)**
PLANSIZE + -0.0407 . 6170 
( .4319)
ADOPT + 2.5113 20.9329 
( . 0001)*
LEV - -0.0157 .0364 
( .8486)
109 + 1 . 3791 7.0062 
(.0081)*
AMEND + -0.2066 . 1666 
( .6831)
SIC + -2.6606 30.7768 
( .0001)*
RETEMP undef ined -0.2353 1.7193 
( . 1898)
* Significant at alpha<.05
** Significant at alpha<.10
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BONUS undefined 1 .9639 3.2456 
( . 0716)**
ASSET + 0.00849 . 0235 
{ . 8782)
ADOPT 2 .5149 21.0405 
( .0001)*
LEV - -0.0258 .0544 
( .8156)
109 + 1.4448 7.6318 
( .0057)*
AMEND + -0.1758 . 1222 
( .7267)
SIC + -2.6665 24.3104 
(.0001)*
RETEMP undef ined -0.2381 1.7675 
( . 1837)




Categories of Announced Amendments 
Increased cost sharing
Increased contributions by future retirees 
Caps on employer contributions
Elimination of benefits to certain classes of retirees
employees 
Use of Preventive/Managed Care 
Change of benefits 
Medicare Integration 
Managed indemnity measures 
Caps on benefits
Linking benefits to number of years of service 
Change of eligibility requirements 
Increased lifetime maximum
Reduced annual maximum out of pocket expense
or
VITA
Jean Elizabeth Finch received her Bachelor of Arts 
degree in International Relations from William Jewell 
College in May, 1976. She received her Master of Business 
Administration with a concentration in Accounting from the 
University of Southwestern Louisiana in 1984. She is a 
Certified Public Accountant in the state of Louisiana and 
taught as an adjunct faculty member at the University of 
Southwestern Louisiana in Lafayette, LA. She received her 
Doctor of Philosophy with a major in Accounting and a minor 
in Economics from Louisiana State University in 1995. Dr. 
Finch is currently an Assistant Professor in the School of 
Accountancy at Southern University and Agricultural and 
Mechanical College in Baton Rouge, LA.
179
DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT
Candidate: Jean Elizabeth Finch
Major Field: Accounting
Title of Diesertation: An Evaluation oi Accounting Method Choice: A
Study oi the Transition Obligation Upon Adoption 








' 0  o




/ I / , - ., ■
' J - ,  _  _  r ( ( ■ — /  ^  .
' T cr
October b, IyhS
